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I.     INTRODUCTION 
Immigrants and immigrant rights advocates knew we were in trouble 
when a Ku Klux Klan “knight” called for shooting unaccompanied 
children (UACs) arriving at the border1 and the Obama administration 
expedited removal proceedings of UACs and children arriving at the 
border with other family members.2  Indeed, the Loyal White Knights of 
the Klan advocate a “shoot-to-kill” border policy,3 and one North 
Carolina Klan leader said the policy should apply to UACs: “If we pop a 
couple of ‘em off and leave the corpses laying on the border, maybe 
they’ll see we’re serious about stopping immigrants.”4  Although the 
White House initially labeled the influx of UACs an “urgent 
humanitarian situation,”5 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and Department of Justice responded by sending a “surge” of 
immigration judges and government attorneys to the border to start 
deportation hearings immediately, while simultaneously sending the 
message to immigration courts around the country that UAC-related 
cases should be prioritized.6 
                                                          
         * Professor of Law, University of San Francisco, Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Cali-
fornia, Davis. Thank you to Amelia Andersen for her able research assistance. 
 1.  Leslie Savan, The KKK Wants a ‘Shoot to Kill’ Policy to Include Migrant Children, THE 
NATION (July 30, 2014, 3:53 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/180840/kkk-wants-shoot-kill-
policy-aimed-immigrant-children#. 
 2.  Katie Zezima, White House: ‘Most’ Unaccompanied Minors at Border Will Likely Be De-
ported, WASHINGTON POST (July 7, 3014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/ 
wp/2014/07/07/white-house-most-unaccompanied-minors-at-border-will-likely-be-deported/. 
 3.  Savan, supra note 1. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Katie Zezima & Ed O’Keefe, Obama Calls Wave of Children Across U.S.-Mexican Border 
‘Urgent Humanitarian Situation,’ WASHINGTON POST (June 2, 2014), http://www.washing 
tonpost.com/politics/obama-calls-wave-of-children-across-us-mexican-border-urgent-humanitarian-
situation/2014/06/02/4d29df5e-ea8f-11e3-93d2-edd4be1f5d9e_story.html. 
 6.  See Alan Gomez, Obama Orders ‘Surge’ to Border to Speed Up Deportations, USA TO-
DAY (June 20, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/20/obama-immigration-
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Time and again, the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws over the 
past twenty years should make us wonder about the cost we are willing 
to pay to enforce the nation’s immigration laws.  Not simply in terms of 
the billions of dollars spent on enforcement,7 but also the cost in terms of 
our basic humanity.  In the name of border integrity and uninformed 
economic claims, hundreds of migrants die each year attempting to cross 
our southern border due to the expanded militarization of the border that 
began with Operation Gatekeeper.8  Hardworking immigrants were 
victimized by Bush-era Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
raids,9 and thousands more lose their jobs each year because of the 
Obama administration’s silent raids.10  The current administration also 
has begun taking a page from the Bush era, instituting raids of 
workplaces frequented by Latinos in New Orleans and other parts of the 
country.11  The result is family separation—often involving U.S. citizen 
members.12  Such destruction to families also results from the expansion 
of the so-called Secure Communities program under the Obama 
administration’s watch, as well as the deportation of refugees and 
longtime lawful permanent residents convicted of aggravated felonies—
in spite of an acknowledgement in criminal justice communities that 
engaging in rehabilitation efforts would be wiser.13  Obama’s DHS also 
made credible fear standards for refugees fleeing to our borders more 
rigorous, then more inhumanely called for expeditious removal of the 
thousands of unaccompanied children arriving at our border who are 
fleeing violence.14 
                                                          
unaccompanied-minors-deportations/11070531/; see also Kate Linthicum, 7,000 Immigrant Chil-
dren Ordered Deported Without Going to Court, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-children-deported-20150306-story.html#page=1; 
Richard Gonzales, Immigration Courts ‘Operating In Crisis Mode,’ Judges Say, NPR (Feb. 23, 
2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/02/23/387825094/immigration-courts-operating-in-crisis-mode-
judges-say. 
 7.  See Louis Jacobson, Luis Gutierrez Says U.S. Spends More on Immigration Enforcement 
Than Other Agencies Combined, POLITIFACT.COM (July 15, 2014, 1:56 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/jul/15/luis-gutierrez/luis-gutierrez-says-us-
spends-more-immigration-bor/ (“We spent $18 billion a year on making sure that the federal gov-
ernment has immigrant enforcement agents”). 
 8.  Jill Holslin, Operation Gatekeeper: 20 Years of Militarizing the Border, ATTHEEDGES.COM 
(Oct. 1, 2014, 9:27 AM), http://www.attheedges.com/2014/10/01/operation-gatekeeper-20-years-of-
militarizing-the-border/. 
 9.  See infra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 10.  See infra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 11.  See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  See infra notes 22–28 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See infra notes 78–109 and accompanying text. 
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In this essay, I review these enforcement tools and what I feel is the 
unnecessary havoc that they wreak on immigrant communities.  In the 
process, I describe the resistance to these policies by immigrants and 
their supporters who have attempted to disrupt the enforcement tools. 
Immigrants and their supporters are attempting to raise awareness of 
better strategies to resolve whatever problems are perceived to exist.  I 
also argue that the disruptive tactics by immigrants and their supporters 
have actually helped to push the Obama administration into engaging in 
disruptive innovation of its own with respect to how to approach certain 
classes of removable immigrants. 
Administrations and officials who engage in these enforcement 
approaches need to be held accountable to fair-minded, humanistic-
thinking Americans.  These actions have occurred on our watch, and we 
should not stand by idly.  Thus, I also submit that we should devise 
methods of holding officials accountable, perhaps by creating a public 
oversight group along the lines of citizen oversight panels of police 
departments that would focus on the anti-humanitarian effects of 
immigration enforcement. 
II.  NIGHTMARISH ICE ENFORCEMENT TOOLS 
Over the past twenty years, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) or, after 9/11, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) has engaged in immigration enforcement actions that, in my view, 
go far beyond what is necessary under the law.  These efforts have 
crossed the line between what is necessary to enforce the immigration 
laws and over-zealous tools that wreak unnecessary havoc on 
communities and a common sense of humanity and decency.  In this part 
of the article, I summarize a handful of ICE and INS enforcement tools 
and priorities that should raise the eyebrows of decent-minded observers. 
A.  Operation Gatekeeper 
Beginning in 1994, the Clinton administration implemented 
Operation Gatekeeper, a strategy of “prevention through deterrence” that 
involved constructing fences and militarizing parts of the southern border 
that were most easily traversed.15  Instead of deterring migrants, their 
entry choices were shifted to treacherous terrain—the desert and the 
                                                          
 15.  Material accompanying footnotes 15 through 16 is Author’s analysis of Operation Gate-
keeper as previously published in BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 185–88 (2004).  
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mountains.  The number of entries and apprehensions were not at all 
decreased, and the number of deaths because of dehydration and 
sunstroke in the summer or freezing in the winter dramatically surged.  
In 1994, fewer than thirty migrants died along the border; by 1998, the 
number was 147; in 2001, 387 deaths were counted; and in 2007, 409 
died. 
The San Diego Sector of the DHS Border Patrol covers the section of 
the United States-Mexico border that historically has been the preferred 
site of entry for those entering the United States without inspection.  This 
sector contains sixty-six miles of international border. Tijuana, Mexico’s 
third largest city, lies directly south of San Diego, California, the sixth 
largest city in the United States.  A smaller Mexican city, Tecate, is 
situated in the eastern end of the sector. 
In 1994, over 450,000 apprehensions of illicit border crossings were 
made in the San Diego sector.  This number far surpassed the sectors 
with the next highest apprehension: Tucson (139,473) and McAllen, 
Texas (124,251).  In the period prior to the end of 1994, undocumented 
border crossers in the San Diego sector commonly entered in the western 
part of the sector near the city of San Diego.  Often, many of these 
individuals traveled through private property, and some were even seen 
darting across busy freeways near the international border inspection 
station.  Clearly, most of the illicit crossers entered along the fourteen-
mile area from Imperial Beach (at the Pacific Ocean) to the base of the 
Otay Mountains.  Most of the stretch involves “easy terrain and gentle 
climbs,” where the crossing lasts only ten or fifteen minutes to a pickup 
point.  Even individuals who were apprehended and turned back across 
the border were just as likely to attempt reentry in the westernmost part 
of the sector at that time.  
These highly visible border crossings resulted in tremendous public 
pressure on the INS to act.  Residents of San Diego complained.  Anti-
immigrant groups demanded action.  Politicians decried lack of border 
control.  President Clinton came up with an answer and an approach to 
the question of “illegal immigration.”  In his State of the Union address 
on January 24, 1995, Clinton signaled a renewed get-tough policy against 
undocumenteds, including “mov[ing] aggressively to secure our borders 
by hiring a record number of border guards” and “cracking down on 
illegal hiring.”  Knowing that Clinton faced reelection in 1996, 
administration officials hoped that renewed enforcement effort against 
undocumented aliens would shore up the president’s support among 
voters in California, who overwhelmingly passed the anti-immigrant 
Proposition 187 in 1994. 
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Operation Gatekeeper was one of several operations that resulted 
from the Clinton administration’s commitment to a new aggressive 
enforcement strategy for the Border Patrol.  In August 1994, the INS 
Commissioner Doris Meissner approved a new national strategy for the 
Border Patrol.  The heart of the plan relied on a vision of “prevention 
through deterrence,” in which a “decisive number of enforcement 
resources [would be brought] to bear in each major entry corridor” and 
the Border Patrol would “increase the number of agents on the line and 
make effective use of technology, raising the risk of apprehension high 
enough to be an effective deterrent.”  The specific regional enforcement 
operations that resulted included (1) Operation Blockade (later renamed 
Hold the Line), which commenced in September 1993 in the Greater El 
Paso, Texas areas; (2) Operation Gatekeeper, which commenced in 
October 1994, south of San Diego, California; (3) Operation Safeguard, 
which also commenced in October 1994 in Arizona; and (4) Operation 
Rio Grande, which commenced in August 1997 in Brownsville, Texas.  
The idea was to block traditional entry and smuggling routes with border 
enforcement personnel and physical barriers.  By cutting off traditional 
crossing routes, the strategy sought to deter migrants or at least channel 
them into terrain less suited for crossing and more conducive to 
apprehensions.  To carry out the strategy, the Border Patrol was to 
concentrate personnel and resources in areas of highest undocumented 
alien crossings, increase the time agents spent on border-control 
activities, increase use of physical barriers, and carefully consider the 
mix of technology and personnel needed to control the border. 
In the San Diego sector, efforts would be concentrated on the 
popular fourteen-mile section of the border beginning from the Pacific 
Ocean (Imperial Beach) stretching eastward.  That stretch had been the 
focus of some resources before Gatekeeper.  Steel fencing and bright 
lighting were already in place in sections of this corridor, erected in part 
with the assistance of the U.S. military.  Yet because of the persistent 
traffic of undocumented entrants along this corridor, phase I of 
Gatekeeper continued to concentrate on increased staffing and resources 
along the fourteen mile area. 
As the INS implemented its national border strategy, Congress 
supported these efforts; between 1993 and 1997, the INS budget for 
enforcement efforts along the southwest border doubled from $400 
million to $800 million.  The number of Border Patrol agents along the 
southwest border increased from 3,389 in October 1993 to 7,357 by 
September 1998—an increase of 117 percent.  State-of-the-art 
technology, including new surveillance systems using electronic sensors 
linked with low-light video cameras, infrared night-vision devices, and 
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forward-looking infrared systems for Border Patrol aircraft, were 
installed. 
Given these additional resources, Operation Gatekeeper buildup was 
impressive.  Before Gatekeeper, the San Diego sector had nineteen miles 
of fencing.  By the end of 1999, fifty-two miles were fenced.  Half of this 
fencing runs from the Pacific Ocean to the base of the Otay Mountains.  
Fourteen miles contain primary fencing (a ten-foot wall of corrugated 
steel landing mats left over from the Vietnam War).  Two backup fences, 
each 115 feet tall, have been constructed.  The first backup fence is made 
of concrete pillars.  The second backup fence is made of wire mesh, with 
support beams.  Both are topped with wire.  Almost twelve miles of this 
stretch are illuminated by stadium lights.  Some fencing has been erected 
on sections of the Otay Mountains, as well as around various East San 
Diego communities along the border.  The Department of Defense’s 
Center for Low Intensity Conflicts as well as the Army Corps of 
Engineers provided guidance to INS on the development of Gatekeeper 
features. 
In contrast, in areas other than San Diego, the construction was not 
as significant.  The El Centro sector covers seventy-two miles of the 
border and is sparsely populated on the U.S. side and has only seven 
miles of fence—all of it between the contiguous border cities of Calexico 
and Mexicali.  Arizona has seventeen miles of fencing—six in the Yuma 
sector and nine in the Tucson sector.  That fencing was erected 
exclusively in the towns and cities.  Texas has the Rio Grande River and 
seven miles of fencing from El Paso/Ciudad Juarez area—two miles of 
primary and five of secondary.  Thus, seventy-three miles of fencing 
were erected on the 2,000 mile southwest border and the sixty-six mile 
San Diego sector contained seventy-two percent of it, as well as fifty-
four percent of the illumination.  The 144-mile long San Diego and El 
Centro sectors have almost a third of the Border Patrol agents stationed 
on the 2,000 miles of southwest border. 
In implementing its national strategy beginning in 1994, the INS 
made a key assumption about its “prevention through deterrence” 
approach: “alien apprehensions will decrease as [the] Border Patrol 
increases control of the border.”  In other words, the INS anticipated that 
as the show of force escalated by increasing agents, lighting, and fencing, 
people would be discouraged from entering without inspection so that the 
number of apprehensions naturally would decline.  In fact, the Border 
Patrol predicted that within five years, a substantial drop in apprehension 
rates border-wide would result.  The deterrence would be so great that 
“many will consider it futile to continue to attempt illegal entry.”  These 
assumptions and predictions have not borne out. 
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Apprehension levels did not decline.  The enforcement strategies 
began with Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego and Operation Blockade 
in El Paso in 1994.  True, apprehension levels for those two sectors were 
considerably lower in 1998 than in 1993 (e.g., 531,689 apprehended in 
San Diego in 1993 compared to 248,092 in 1998).  However, the 
apprehension levels surged in El Centro, Yuma, and Tucson during the 
same period (e.g., from 92,639 to 387,406 in Tucson; from 30,508 to 
226,695 in El Centro; and from 23,548 to 76,195 in Yuma).  From 1994 
to 1999, total apprehensions statistics along the southwest border actually 
increased by 57 percent.  The increase continues.  The number of 
apprehensions for all of the fiscal year 2000 was 1.64 million, which was 
an all-time high.  In sum, after Gatekeeper sealed the westernmost 
section of the border, apprehensions in San Diego declined, but crossers 
moved east and overall apprehensions actually increased substantially. 
The INS thought that with the combination of fencing and increased 
spending on border patrols at the most frequently traveled routes, 
undocumented immigration would slow if not come to a complete halt 
altogether.  But migrants were not deterred, and began looking for other 
areas to penetrate the border.  However, the new areas of travel were 
risky; they were more dangerous and life threatening.  Given the 
challenges, more migrants turned to costly smugglers to help them cross 
the border. 
As Operation Gatekeeper closed the Imperial Beach corridor, the 
border-crossing traffic moved east.  Frustrated crossers moved first to 
Brown Field and Chula Vista, and subsequently to the eastern sections of 
the San Diego sector.  Before Gatekeeper began in 1994, crossers were 
just as likely to make their second try at the westernmost part of the 
sector, but that changed very quickly.  By January 1995, only fourteen 
percent were making their second try near Imperial Beach.  The illicit 
border traffic had moved into “unfamiliar and unattractive territory.”  
The tragedy of Operation Gatekeeper is the direct link of its prevention 
through deterrence strategy to an absolutely horrendous rise in the 
number of deaths among border-crossers who were forced to attempt 
entry over terrain that even the INS knew to present “mortal danger” due 
to extreme weather conditions and rugged terrain. 
The death statistics are revealing.  In 1994, twenty-three migrants 
died along the California-Mexico border.  Of the twenty-three, two died 
of hypothermia or heat stroke and nine from drowning.  By 1998, the 
annual total was 147 deaths—seventy-one from hypothermia or heat 
stroke and fifty-two from drowning.  Figures for 1999 follow this 
unfortunate trend, and in 2000, eighty-four were heat stroke or 
hypothermia casualties.  In spite of the aid of smugglers, the new routes 
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were simply too dangerous for many border-crossers and death of 
migrants surged.  The number of migrant deaths increased 600 times 
from 1994 to 2000; a number that could be attributed to Operation 
Gatekeeper’s pushing surreptitious entries toward treacherous eastward 
routes.16 
From 1997 to 2013, over 6,000 known migrant deaths occurred 
along the Mexico-Arizona border.17  The remains of 477 people were 
found in 2012 alone.18  Many more bodies likely remain undiscovered, 
and of the ones that are found, many go unidentified.19 
B.  Bush ICE Raids 
On a cold, raw December morning in Marshalltown, Iowa, Teresa 
Blanco woke up to go to work at the local Swift meat packing plant.20  
Hundreds of others across the town were doing the same thing, in spite of 
the miserable mixture of sleet, mist, and slush that awaited them outside 
their front doors.  As they made their way to the plant, the workers, who 
were from Mexico, did not mind the weather. 
Unfortunately, the workers’ day turned into a nightmare soon after 
they reported for work.  Not long after the plant opened, heavily armed 
agents from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency 
stormed onto the scene.  Pandemonium broke out. The workers panicked; 
many began to run; others tried to hide, some in dangerous and 
hazardous areas.  As the ICE agents began rounding up all the workers, 
they ordered those who were U.S. citizens to go to the cafeteria.  
Noncitizens were directed to a different section of the plant.  Agents 
shouted out instructions: documenteds in one line, undocumenteds in 
another.  If an agent suspected that the person in the citizens’ line was 
undocumented, the agent would instruct the person to get into the 
undocumented line.  More than one individual was told, “You have 
                                                          
     16.    Id. 
 17.  See Daniel E. Martinez et al., Structural Violence and Migrant Deaths in Southern Arizo-
na: Data from the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990–2013, J. ON MIGRATION AND 
HUMAN SECURITY 257, 258 (2014), http://www.academia.edu/8980501/Structural_Vi 
olence_and_Migrant_Deaths_in_Southern_Arizona_Data_from_the_Pima_County_Office_of_the_
Medical_Examiner_1990-2013.  
 18.  Gomez, supra note 6. 
 19.  Patrick O’Driscoll & Haya El Nasser, Summer Can Be Lethal for Illegals, USA TODAY 
(May 18, 2003, 11:22 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-05-18-border-
usat_x.htm.  
 20.  Material accompanying footnotes 20 through 21 is Author’s analysis of the Bush ICE raids 
as  previously published in Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Re-
form, 44 USF L.REV. 307, 307 (2009).  
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Mexican teeth. You need to go to that line [for undocumented persons] 
and get checked.” 
The nightmare was only beginning.  Although supervisory ICE 
agents carried a civil warrant for a few individuals, the squad demanded 
that all plant employees be held, separated by nationality.  That included 
U.S. citizen workers who were interrogated and detained.  No one was 
free to leave—not even those who carried evidence of lawful status or 
proof they were in the process of seeking proper permission to be in this 
country.  Each was interrogated individually.  The process took the entire 
day, and phone calls were not permitted until later in the day.  By the end 
of the day, ninety were arrested, but hundreds, including citizens, had 
been detained for hours.  The entire community was shaken to its core. 
That morning of December 12, 2006, the feast day of Our Lady of 
Guadalupe and a holy day of special significance to Catholics of 
Mexican descent, ICE conducted a massive military style raid on six 
Swift & Company meatpacking plants across the nation’s heartland.  
Hundreds of federal agents in riot gear, armed with assault weapons, 
descended upon plants in Cactus, Texas; Greeley, Colorado; Grand 
Island, Nebraska; Worthington, Minnesota; Marshalltown, Iowa; and 
Hyrum, Utah. 
ICE was there to execute arrest warrants for a handful of named 
workers—less than one percent of the workforce.  The sheer number of 
ICE agents on the scene and the manner in which the operation was 
conducted made clear that the execution of those warrants was not the 
government’s real purpose.  Rather, the raids seemed designed to ramp 
up the number of arrests and capture the headlines on the evening news.  
ICE rounded up nearly 13,000 workers—the vast majority of them U.S. 
citizens—holding them against their will for hours. 
U.S. citizen Melissa Broekemeier worked at the Swift plant in 
Marshalltown for more than eight years.  But the “longest day [she] ever 
worked was on December 12, 2007.”  Broekemeier described her 
experience on the day of the Swift raid this way: 
I, like all my coworkers that went to work that day . . . we were 
instructed by our supervisors to finish up . . . and report to the cafeteria, 
where we were inspected, and our private lives were scrutinized by ICE 
agents as if we were illegal convicts. 
. . . . 
The power that runs our machines should have been shut off first, but it 
was not. 
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. . . . 
The Federal government jeopardized our safety and health without 
care.  We were overlooked.  We were ignored.  We were treated like 
criminals.  We were not free to leave. 
A different ICE raid in Stillmore, Georgia, the Friday before Labor 
Day weekend in 2006, evoked outcry from local residents who labeled 
the ICE action as nothing short of “Gestapo tactics.”  Descending shortly 
before midnight, ICE agents swarmed the area, eventually arresting and 
deporting 125 undocumented workers.  Most of those rounded up were 
men, while their wives fled to the woods to hide children in tow.  In the 
weeks after the raid, at least 200 more immigrants left town.  Many of 
the women purchased bus tickets to Mexico with their husband’s final 
paycheck.  The impact underscored how vital undocumented immigrants 
were to the local economy.  Trailer parks lie abandoned.  The poultry 
plant scrambled to replace more than half its workforce.  Business dried 
up at stores.  The community of about a thousand people became little 
more than a ghost town.  The operator of a trailer park that was raided, 
David Robinson, commented, “These people might not have American 
rights, but they’ve damn sure got human rights.  There ain’t no reason to 
treat them like animals.” 
Local residents witnessed the events, as ICE officials raided local 
homes and trailer parks, forcing many members of the community out of 
Stillmore.  Officials were seen stopping motorists, breaking into homes, 
and there were even reports of officials threatening people with tear gas.  
Witnesses reported seeing ICE officials breaking windows and entering 
homes through floorboards.  Mayor Marilyn Slater commented, “This 
reminds me of what I read about Nazi Germany, the Gestapo coming in 
and yanking people up.”21 
C.  Secure Communities 
The Secure Communities initiative that referred fingerprint 
information to DHS via the FBI for all participating jurisdictions was 
intended to focus on serious criminals.22  Yet, the vast majority of 
individuals removed as a result of Secure Communities referrals were 
                                                          
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Aarti Kohli et al., Secure Communities by the Numbers: An Analysis of Demographics and 
Due Process 1 THE CHIEF JUST. EARL WARREN INST. ON L. & SOC. POL’Y 3 (2011), available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf.  
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noncriminal or low-level offenders.23  And DHS took the strict position 
on Secure Communities that it could access all fingerprints submitted to 
the FBI by local law enforcement officials even without the permission 
of state and local officials.24  In fact, Secure Communities casts a wide 
net and scoops up the fingerprints of everyone not born in the United 
States, whether or not they pose a criminal risk.25  For example, an 
abused woman in San Francisco worked up the courage to call police, 
but she was arrested as well because the police saw a “red mark” on the 
alleged abuser’s cheek.26  The charges against her were dropped, but her 
fingerprints were already forwarded to ICE under the Secure 
Communities program, and she faced deportation.27  This case was an 
exact replica of one that occurred in Maryland.28 
D.  Silent Raids 
Soon after Janet Napolitano took over as Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2009, she made clear that 
the gun-toting ICE raids of the Bush era did not fit into her enforcement 
strategy.29  That turned out to be true for a while.30  Instead, she would be 
targeting employers who hired undocumented workers.31 
Targeting employers presumably is based on enforcing employer 
sanctions laws that have been on the books since the Immigration and 
Reform Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).32  However, the Obama 
administration’s focus-on-employers-rather-than-workers strategy in fact 
                                                          
 23.  Id. at 3, 9. 
 24.  Immigration Policy Center, Secure Communities: A Fact Sheet, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/secure-communities-fact-
sheet.  
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Lee Romney & Paloma Esquivel, Noncriminals Swept Up in Federal Deportation Pro-
gram, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/25/local/la-me-secure-
communities-20110425. 
 27.  Id. 
 28. Shankar Vedantam, Call for Help Leads to Possible Deportation for Hyattsville Mother, 
WASH. POST, (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/11/01/AR2010110103073.html .  
 29.  Secretary Seeks Review of Immigration Raid, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/washington/26immig.html?_r=0.  
 30.  See infra notes 138–81 and accompanying text. 
 31.  Secretary Seeks Review of Immigration Raid, infra note 114. 
 32.  Peter Brownell, The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions, MIGRATION INFOR-
MATION SOURCE (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/declining-enforcement-
employer-sanctions. 
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falls squarely on the shoulders of the workers.33  Immigration raids at 
factories and farms were replaced with a quieter enforcement strategy: 
sending federal agents to scour companies’ records for undocumented 
immigrant workers.  “While the sweeps of the past commonly led to the 
deportation of such workers, the ‘silent raids,’ as employers call the 
audits, usually result in the workers being fired, but in many cases they 
are not deported.”  The idea is that if the workers cannot work, they will 
self-deport, leaving on their own.  However, they actually do not leave 
because they need to work.  They become more desperate and take jobs 
at lower wages.  Given the increasing scale of enforcement, this can lead 
to an overall reduction in the average wage level for millions of workers, 
which is, in effect, a subsidy to employers.  Over a twelve-month period, 
ICE conducted audits of employee files at more than 2900 companies.  
“The agency . . . levied a record $3 million in civil fines [in the first six 
months of 2010] on businesses that hired unauthorized immigrants, 
according to official figures.”  Thousands of workers were fired. 
“Employers say the audits reach more companies than the work-site 
roundups” of the Bush administration.  “The audits force businesses to 
fire every suspected” undocumented worker “on the payroll––not just 
those who happened to be on duty at the time of a raid––and make it 
much harder to hire other unauthorized workers as replacements.”  
Auditing is effective in getting unauthorized workers fired for sure. 
Whether the Obama or Bush administrations, or the Clinton 
administration before them, actually want to stop migration to the United 
States or imagines that this could be done without catastrophic 
consequences is doubtful.  More likely, the workers are being used as 
pawns.  The very industries they target for enforcement are so dependent 
on the labor of migrants they would collapse without it.  Instead, 
immigration policy and enforcement consigns those migrants to an 
“illegal” status, and undermines the price of their labor.  Enforcement is 
a means for managing the flow of migrants and making their labor 
available to employers at a price they want to pay. 
In 1998, the Clinton administration mounted the largest sanctions 
enforcement action to date, in which agents sifted through the names of 
24,310 workers in forty Nebraska meatpacking plants.  They then sent 
letters to 4,762 workers, saying their documents were bad, and over 
3,500 were forced from their jobs.  Mark Reed, who directed “Operation 
                                                          
 33.  Material accompanying footnotes 33 through 34 is the Author’s analysis of the Silent Raids 
as previously published in David Bacon and Bill Ong Hing, The Rise and Fall of Employer Sanc-
tions, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 77, 80 (2010). 
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Vanguard,” claimed it was really intended to pressure Congress and 
employer groups to support guest worker legislation.  “We depend on 
foreign labor,” he declared.  “If we don’t have illegal immigration 
anymore, we’ll have the political support for guest workers.”34 
E.  Targeted Enforcement Operations 
Unfortunately, the Obama administration’s commitment to not 
engaging in Bush era-type raids was impermanent.  For example, in New 
Orleans in 2013, ICE began waging war on the Latino immigrant 
community, using raids with suspicious racial effects.35  The 
circumstances of the raids were every bit as disturbing as Bush raids. 
In the summer of 2014, I spoke with two men in ICE detention who 
were swept up in a raid at an auto-body shop under the so-
called Criminal Alien Removal Initiative (CARI).36  On May 13, 2014 
Wilmer and Yestel were arrested when ICE conducted a sweeping 
workplace raid of a Latino auto shop in a heavily Latino suburb of New 
Orleans.  Yestel and Wilmer told me how ICE agents and local police 
surrounded the auto shop, blocking off all exits and grabbing all Latinos 
in sight, including workers and customers, men and women. Wilmer was 
a mechanic at the shop who was working on repairs, while Yestel was a 
customer who just happened to be at the shop getting his car repaired.  
After being detained, their fingerprints were processed with a high-tech 
machine in the back of the ICE van.  Both men were then arrested, and 
neither had seen their homes or partners for weeks. 
Under CARI, ICE squads—sometimes accompanied by local 
police—have been raiding apartment complexes, grocery stores, 
laundromats, Bible study groups, parks, and anywhere else Latinos might 
gather.  The officers make stop-and-frisk type arrests based on racial 
profiling and the indiscriminate mobile fingerprinting.  The raids make 
daily routines such as going to buy groceries or bringing the car to get 
repaired a terrifying task that can lead to deportation. 
                                                          
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See generally, SAKET SONI ET AL., THE CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL INITIATIVE IN NEW 
ORLEANS (2013), available at http://www.nowcrj.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/CARI-report-
final.pdf. 
 36.  The analysis of “Targeted Enforcement Operations” as illustrated by the story of Wilmer 
Irias Palma and Yestel Velasquez accompanying footnotes 36 through 37 was previously published 
in Bill Ong Hing, Civil Rights Abuse: Evil Nature of Obama Deportation Machine in New Orleans, 
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Aug.  7, 2014), http://www.lawprofessors.typepad.com/immig 
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While the CARI program name suggests that “criminals” are the 
target, in fact these raids are racial profiling-based area sweeps.  Wilmer 
Irias Palma and Yestel Velasquez were arrested because they have prior 
deportation orders—they do not have criminal records—not even traffic 
tickets.  Wilmer and Yestel arrived after Hurricane Katrina to help with 
the reconstruction.  Both men did demolition and clean-up, exposed to 
hazards and surrounded by chemicals.  The waste smell was awful, and 
they often got sick and developed skin rashes.  Many Latino workers 
they knew suffered serious injuries on the job.  Some workers died.  Still, 
Wilmer and Yestel were happy to help rebuild the city and aid its 
economic growth.  They, like other Latinos, settled in New Orleans and 
started families.  They were happy that former residents were able to 
return to the city and live with dignity after so much destruction.  Now, 
the Latino workers who made that possible feel hunted and treated like 
trash. 
 In November 2013, brave immigrant workers and community leaders 
exposed the destructive CARI community raids in a protest.  And shortly 
after their arrest in May, Yestel and Wilmer courageously came forward 
to expose the ongoing ICE raids.  They filed a civil rights complaint with 
the Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties and asked DHS to end the raids.  While their civil rights 
complaint was pending, ICE promised that their removal would be 
stayed for a year, but they would remain in detention.  During their 
interviews with DHS civil rights officials, Yestel and Wilmer were even 
shackled and under ICE surveillance. 
Three years earlier in June 2011, ICE announced a Prosecutorial 
Discretion Policy promising that upstanding residents like Yestel and 
Wilmer engaged in protecting civil rights would not be enforcement 
priorities.  Under that policy, Yestel and Wilmer should have been 
granted immediate release from detention—especially as witnesses and 
victims participating in a civil rights investigation.  In fact, like 
whistleblowers to unseemly official actions, they should be encouraged 
and protected.  
 Instead, less than twenty-four hours after Yestel and Wilmer 
participated in a Washington, D.C., civil rights briefing by telephone, in 
a shocking development,  ICE revoked their stays of removal and 
announced that they would be deported within days.  ICE directly and 
spitefully retaliated against Yestel and Wilmer for speaking out about 
civil rights.  Eventually, Wilmer was indeed deported, but Yestel was 
allowed to stay for another year in an inexplicable split decision.  
Whatever result, this kind of retaliation creates a chilling effect that goes 
far beyond the individuals involved. 
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The fact that these ICE raids continue is deeply troubling.  The fact 
that ICE can retaliate against immigrant civil rights leaders for exposing 
abuse is even more disturbing.  The vengeance raises the concern that 
this civil rights crisis is not an isolated product of a rogue ICE office in 
the Deep South, but rather a product of Obama’s national deportation 
policies.  The administration continues its record-breaking deportation 
pace, and as a result of CARI, Louisiana has the highest per capita 
deportation rate in the country, as well as the highest per capita rate of 
immigration arrests of any non-border state.  The raids, detentions, and 
deportations show that the administration is either incapable of 
addressing rampant civil rights violations by its own agents, or is willing 
to turn a blind eye to a rogue agency in exchange for record-setting 
deportation numbers.  
 It turns out that the CARI program in New Orleans is not the only 
ICE raids undertaken under the Obama administration.  Soon after news 
of the CARI program in New Orleans broke out, immigrants and 
community advocates around the country reported significant increases 
of individuals detained as “collateral” arrestees during similar raids.  
This increase is particularly noticeable in places like New York, 
Philadelphia, Wisconsin, Washington, Alabama, Massachusetts, Florida 
and Illinois.  Incidents involving “collateral arrests of people with old 
criminal convictions or prior deportation orders” have sharply increased 
in Georgia and Connecticut.  Arrests and home raids of organizers in 
places like Arizona have been reported. 
ICE officials do not label these policies “raids.”  Instead, in its 
terminology, ICE conducts “‘targeted enforcement’ operations to arrest 
‘priority’ individuals who present a danger to the public.”  In fact, there 
is no difference.  “Targeted enforcement” operations are raids. “In a 
targeted enforcement operation, ICE stakes out a single home, apartment 
building, business, or—in some cases—an entire neighborhood in search 
of its target.”  ICE agents ask for papers from individuals encountered, 
arresting and deporting many who were not initially targeted.  The ICE 
Fugitive Operations team and other ICE components conduct the 
operations under the direction of the local Field Office Director.  These 
operations are not limited to businesses.  In the words of one day laborer 
organizer in New Orleans, 
Before ICE used to round people up in the community.  Now, they go 
to people’s houses.  They show them a picture of a person they usually 
don’t know. Even if the person isn’t there, everyone in the house still 
gets fingerprinted using the biometric machines.  The only difference is 
ICE makes sure to show people a photograph so that they can say it is 
targeted enforcement and not a raid. 
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To make matters worse, ICE has retaliated against community 
organizers and immigrants who have been advocating against removals 
and for those being held in custody.  An Arizona advocate reports that 
“[i]n retaliation for organizing, ICE has denied people’s visitation rights, 
gone out of their way to keep people in detention even when granted 
bond, and even put people’s family members in solitary confinement,” or 
denied visitation rights.  In Tacoma, Washington, the families of 
organizers who participated in a detention center hunger strike also 
suffered retaliation.  Family visits are often reduced to 10 or 20 
minutes.37 
F.  Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents Without a Fair Hearing 
When President Obama announced his expansive actions in 
November 2014 to grant deferred action and employment authorization 
to undocumented parents of U.S. citizens, he emphasized that deportation 
would be focused on “felons, not families.”38 While this is a catchy 
phrase, its flaw is obvious: 
“People with felonies have families too,” said [Abraham] Paulos, 
whose organization Families for Freedom advocates for families 
who’ve been separated by criminal deportation. “That’s a false binary 
[Obama] is setting up,” said Tia Oso, the Arizona organizer for the 
Black Alliance for Just Immigration. Oso pointed out that because 
blacks in the U.S. are already targeted by the War on Drugs and racial 
and ethnic profiling by police, partnerships between law enforcement 
and immigration authorities mean that black immigrants are in 
detention and criminal deportation proceedings at a rate five times their 
actual presence in the U.S. undocumented community.39 
Rithy Yin was a baby when his family fled the killing fields of the 
Cambodian Khmer Rouge, that took his father’s life, and entered the 
United States as refugees.40 In a Seattle inner city neighborhood “plagued 
with drugs and gang violence . . . Rithy turn[ed] to the streets to find 
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acceptance,” and he was in state prison by the age of eighteen.41 While 
serving his entire ten-year sentence, Rithy “grew up,” completing his 
GED, working in the prison ministry, and providing moral support to 
new inmates.42 However, on his release from prison, Rithy was greeted 
by an ICE deportation order, even though he is totally unfamiliar with 
Cambodia, and his mother, siblings, and their families are all in the 
United States.43 
Many other Cambodian refugees who have committed crimes have 
been deported or face the prospect of removal.44 All paid the price of 
their crimes by serving their time in prison, but unlike U.S. citizens, they 
face the additional punishment of banishment, even though they have 
strong evidence of rehabilitation and remorse.45 Once classified as an 
aggravated felon (usually for being sentenced to a year or more in 
prison), their long residence in the United States and the effect of 
deportation on their families is irrelevant in deportation proceedings.46 
Consider Lundy Khoy.47  Lundy Khoy is facing deportation because 
of the U.S. immigration law zero-tolerance policy toward aggravated 
felons.  Lundy was born in a Thai refugee camp after her parents fled the 
genocide in Cambodia. When she was one-year-old, she and her family 
came to the United States as refugees. Lundy and her parents were 
granted lawful permanent residence status when Lundy was in 
kindergarten, but they never filed for citizenship through naturalization 
because of the expense. In 2000, when Lundy was a 19-year-old 
freshman at George Mason University, she was stopped by a bicycle cop 
who asked if she had any drugs. She answered honestly and told the 
officer that she had seven tabs of ecstasy, but that they were not all for 
her. She was arrested for possession with intent to distribute. On the 
advice of her lawyer, she pled guilty,48 to spare her family the expense 
and embarrassment of a trial. She was sentenced to five years in prison. 
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Although Lundy was released and placed on probation after serving 
only a few months in prison, her conviction is an aggravated felony for 
deportation purposes.  In the spring of 2004, Lundy arrived at a 
regularly scheduled probation appointment to show off her college 
report card. When she stepped inside the office, she was greeted by 
her probation officer and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 
agents who were targeting removable agents on active probation. She 
was instructed to hand over possessions and stand spread eagle 
against the wall; they handcuffed and transported her to Hampton 
Roads Regional Jail in Portsmouth, Virginia. Given her aggravated 
felony conviction, an immigration judge ordered Lundy deported 
without hearing evidence of her childhood in the United States, 
current family situation, her educational pursuits, and her perfect 
cooperation during her probation. Lundy remained in ICE custody for 
nine months, while the United States attempted to deport her to 
Cambodia. However, only because Cambodia is taking its time in 
issuing travel documents for Lundy, ICE has released her pending the 
documents. 
Now in her early thirties, Lundy is trying to lead a normal life as 
she awaits her fate. Having been born in a Thai refugee camp and 
lived in the United States since the age of one, she finds it hard to 
imagine being removed to Cambodia, a country with which she has no 
familiarity or family ties; all her relatives live here. She is now trying 
to complete her bachelor’s degree, works full-time as a college 
enrollment counselor, and volunteers for local charities, including 
Habitat for Humanity and the Boys and Girls Club. If Lundy had been 
born in the United States (like her two siblings) or if her parents had 
become naturalized citizens before Lundy turned 18 (automatically 
giving her citizenship), she would not be on the deportation list. 
Lundy lives in Washington, DC, a few blocks from her sister, 
Linda, who is only eighteen months younger, but is a U.S. citizen 
because she was born after the family arrived in the United States. 
The two are inseparable. They grew up sharing a bed and a bedroom, 
until Lundy started college. Linda is Lundy’s most ardent supporter. 
They cook together, go out together, laugh together, and cry together; 
they think of each other as soul mates. They share intimate details 
about each other’s’ lives. Linda joins Lundy in speaking out about 
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current deportation policies, and the two are working with community 
based organizations in Washington, DC, and Philadelphia to seek a 
legislative solution for those who are in the same shoes as Lundy. 
When Lundy is feeling depressed or worried, Linda provides 
emotional support to bring Lundy back from those lows. Linda cannot 
imagine what her life would be like if Lundy was deported to 
Cambodia. 
“We have a glimpse of what Lundy Khoy would accomplish with a 
second chance, as she continues working as a college counselor, pursuing 
her degree, and engaging in volunteer work. Instead, she awaits a 
deportation notice, foreclosed of an opportunity to plead for a second 
chance.” “Many deported noncitizens like Lundy are removed to 
countries where they have virtually no ties. However, the federal courts 
are not in a position to intervene, because any noncitizen convicted of an 
aggravated felony is subject to deportation from the United States 
without statutory relief.”49 
Of course, the deportation of so-called criminal immigrants who 
deserve a second chance is not limited to Cambodian refugees. Every day 
DHS deports lawful permanent residents from all over the world who 
have committed crimes.50 More often than not, family separation results, 
as U.S. citizen or lawful resident parents, spouses, and children remain.51 
The thought, or perhaps lack of thoughtfulness, behind some 
deportations is numbing. For example, when I heard about the 
deportation of Tatyana Mitrohina,52 the circumstances were hard to 
fathom. 
Tatyana was born in Russia in 1978. She was born with multiple 
health problems, including heart defects.  Both of her hands are small 
and partially deformed.  She has a similar problem with her feet.  Her 
parents abandoned Tatyana immediately after birth.  She spent the first 
ten years of her life in hospitals, rehabilitation facilities, and a boarding 
school for disabled children without contact with her parents.  She 
underwent several surgical procedures to correct her birth defects, but the 
abnormalities of her hands and feet were never fully corrected. 
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As with most children, these first ten years of Tatyana’s life had 
profound impact on her emotionally and psychologically.  She had 
multiple caretakers and had no one to whom she felt attached.  She felt 
rejected and abandoned by her biological family.  When asked about the 
effect this period of her life had on her, Tatyana explained: “I didn’t like 
to be touched, I couldn’t stand to be touched or hugged.”  A psychologist 
who evaluated Tatyana observed: “Ms. Mitrohina demonstrates a range 
of psychopathology frequently observed as a sequel of early neglect, 
abandonment and institutionalization, emotional rejection, and physical 
trauma.” 
When she was about seven years old, after she was released from the 
hospital, Tatyana’s maternal grandmother took responsibility for her.  At 
the time, Tatyana was unaware that she had a family.  A year or so later, 
her father began to visit, and about three years later, he decided to bring 
Tatyana back into the family. 
Her father brought Tatyana home to live with family because that 
made the family eligible for a better apartment in Russia.  The 
atmosphere in the home was hostile, chaotic, and filled with conflict.  
Tatyana’s mother was opposed to her return and was openly hostile and 
critical of Tatyana.  Tatyana was constantly beaten by both parents. Her 
parents continually told her that she was “inadequate and worthless.”  
The psychological evaluation reported a “history of neglect, physical and 
verbal abuse as a child and one attempted molestation between the age of 
8 and 10.” 
The tense home life led to the disintegration of the family.  Her 
parents divorced when Tatyana was twelve.  Her father departed, and 
Tatyana was left with her mother who did not want her.  So when 
Tatyana turned fourteen, her grandmother, who had legal custody, signed 
adoption papers.  Oldrich and Ruth Gann of Sonoma, California, who 
were 68 and 63 years old, respectively, at the time, adopted Tatyana and 
brought her to the United States in 1993. 
Tatyana had difficulty adapting to her new family.  She constantly 
felt that she could not live up to her adoptive parents’ expectations.  Her 
dislike of being touched or held persisted into her late teens.  She had 
difficulty addressing her new parents as “mom” and “dad.”  To Tatyana, 
the relationship was a “mismatch” and she did not get along with her 
adoptive parents from the start. 
Concerned with the conflict, Tatyana’s adoptive parents had her 
evaluated by a psychologist.  The psychologist prescribed medication, 
and her parents threatened to send Tatyana back to Russia if she did not 
take the medication.  Tatyana did not appreciate the psychological 
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treatment and argued with her parents; her parents often called the police 
after these altercations erupted.  Tatyana felt trapped and became 
depressed and angry.  An argument in 1999 led to a call to the police.  
When the police arrived, Tatyana was so upset that she kicked her 
adoptive father in the leg in front of the police officer.  Tatyana was 
taken into custody, but charges were later dismissed. 
In 2000, while still living with her adoptive parents, Tatyana 
threatened to kill herself.  She was not arrested, but she was taken to a 
mental health facility for three days.  She eventually moved out of her 
parents’ house.  Since then, Tatyana’s adoptive father has passed away 
and she has not maintained contact with her adoptive mother. 
After moving out, Tatyana rented a room from a young man with 
whom she later became emotionally involved.  She soon noticed that he 
mistreated his six-year-old son.  On one occasion, the child was 
complaining about a stomach pain, and the father refused to do anything, 
so Tatyana called an ambulance. 
After that, the landlord was abusive toward her for eighteen months.  
In 2002, after an argument, Tatyana kicked him several times.  He called 
the police, and she was arrested and pled guilty to a misdemeanor 
battery.  Tatyana received thirty-six months formal probation, and was 
ordered to pay fines and fees, complete a 52-week batterer’s program, 
maintain employment, and complete community service.  She 
successfully completed all the terms of her sentence. 
Tatyana held a variety of jobs in the United States and attended 
junior college.  She worked at the Sonoma Market, Baskin Robins, and 
provided care for the elderly through an agency.  She lost these jobs 
because of anger management problems. She worked for a time caring 
for elderly residents at an assisted living facility.  Tatyana admitted that 
she had kicked an elderly patient three or four times while working at 
this facility.  The patient did not report the incident because she suffered 
from Alzheimer’s Disease.  Tatyana took classes at a junior college over 
a two-year period from Spring 2005 to Spring 2007. 
Tatyana became pregnant by a man named John Carter Goode.  The 
baby was born on October 17, 2005.  Although Tatyana tried to get him 
involved, the father of the child was never involved in the child’s life.  
Tatyana had no one to rely on for financial help or other assistance in the 
child’s upbringing.  Her probation officer noted that Tatyana lacked “a 
support system for parenting and when she needs a break, she has been 
unable to secure a reliable babysitter.”  Although Tatyana was eventually 
convicted of child abuse, the child protective services investigator 
observed that the child was “healthy, had suffered no long-term injury, 
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and appeared to be slightly advanced for his chronological age.”  When 
her son was a year and a half old, Tatyana got a job at Metro PCS, a 
wireless phone company, in an attempt to get off of welfare assistance.  
She lost that job when she was arrested in June 2007. 
On June 26, 2007, when the child was just under two years old, the 
child spilled some water and then grabbed a roll of paper towels to clean 
up the mess.  He scattered paper towels all over the floor. According to a 
pre-sentence report: 
Tatyana then grabbed the victim, took him to the bedroom, and threw 
him on the bed to give him a “time out.”  She then began to slap the 
victim with her hands, on his head and legs, approximately ten times.  
Tatyana stated: “I was yelling at him like he was 20,” even though she 
knew he could not understand.  The defendant explained that she did not 
stop when she should have, and left a bruise and mark on his face.  
Victim John Doe was screaming and crying as she hit him. 
Tatyana commented that the instant matter was not the first time she 
slapped victim Joe [sic] Doe, but indicated that it was the worst because 
it left a mark.  She said she would become angered when John Doe, as a 
newborn, “threw up” or “pooped” too much.  She admitted that she had 
been hurting victim John Doe since he was born, and had become more 
physical with him as he grew older.  At times, she slapped him and threw 
him on the ground.  She also admitted that approximately one year 
earlier, she had hit John Doe in the face and caused a large, visible bruise 
under his eye. 
Tatyana then took her child to a day care center, explained to an 
employee that she had become frustrated with her son at home and had 
struck him with her bare hands.  She left the child at the day care and 
went to her job.  The child was visibly bruised on his left temple.  A 
county worker interviewed Tatyana later that day, noting that she “did 
not cry, and appeared very cold and nonchalant about the abuse.  She 
was only concerned about being arrested and not about the condition of 
her son, and never once asked if he had gone to the hospital or if he was 
alright.” 
As a result of this incident, the child was removed from Tatyana’s 
care, and child abuse charges were brought.  Tatyana pled guilty and was 
sentenced to 120 days in jail and four years on probation.  Ultimately, 
she was only required to serve about a month in jail.  A probation officer 
who interviewed Tatyana while she was in custody noted that she was 
very remorseful and forthcoming throughout the interview, noting that 
she “has struggled with shame and guilt while in custody, and has spent 
much time in introspection.”  When she was first taken into custody, 
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Tatyana was very upset and she cried a lot.  The mental health staff in the 
county jail determined that she was likely suffering from depression, 
perhaps due to a chemical imbalance in her brain.  So she was prescribed 
Zoloft.  Zoloft is an antidepressant drug, used to treat depression, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, anxiety disorders, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
While she was in jail for the child abuse conviction, Tatyana was on 
a “no mix” status, and was unable to avail herself to counseling and other 
resources normally offered to inmates.  In spite of that status, she sought 
to participate in anger management correspondence courses.  She took 
responsibility for her actions and was remorseful.  She was committed to 
doing whatever was required to successfully reunite with her son. She 
testified, “My baby is first in my life now. I know I need to get help 
myself in order to take care of my baby.” 
The child was placed into foster care and became the subject of 
juvenile court proceedings.  In early October 2007, the juvenile court 
ordered that family reunification services be offered to Tatyana.  The 
court’s goal was to reunify Tatyana with her child.  Tatyana was ordered 
to participate in a number of different services, including counseling and 
domestic violence programs.  The problem was that by then, Tatyana 
was in ICE custody, unable to comply with the juvenile court’s order. 
If Tatyana had been a U.S. citizen, after her month in jail, she would 
have been released from custody.  However, she was a lawful permanent 
resident alien who now had committed a deportable offense.  So ICE 
officials took custody of Tatyana upon her release from jail and kept her 
in custody pending removal proceedings.  By the time her removal 
hearing took place, she had been in custody for four months. 
Tatyana wanted to abide by the juvenile court’s mandate because she 
had the utmost desire to resolve her personal problems and regain 
custody of her son.  The problem, of course, was that Tatyana was in ICE 
custody facing removal proceedings, so she could not follow the juvenile 
court’s order.  Being out of ICE custody would have given her the 
opportunity to straighten out and have a chance at reunifying with her 
son.  If she had been able to do that, her posture in the deportation case 
would have been far different. 
In determining whether Tatyana merited a favorable exercise of 
discretion, the immigration judge felt that he had to balance the positive 
factors in Tatyana’s case against the negative ones to determine whether 
the granting of relief was “in the best interests” of the country. In 
choosing to interpret the balance unfavorably and conclude that Tatyana 
was not deserving of a waiver, the judge used the following reasoning: 
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There are factors about the respondent’s life that evoke genuine 
sympathy. She has to live her life with visibly deformed hands. She 
spent her first seven years in a hospital, and was essentially abandoned 
by her birth parents. She was in an abusive relationship, and she 
testified that the father of her child has never played any meaningful 
role in his life. In addition, if the respondent is removed to Russia, she 
may find it difficult to support herself, and has no real family to rely 
upon. She also points out that if she is removed her son will grow up as 
an orphan, in much the same way she did. She wrote letters to the 
sentencing judge in the Superior Court and to this court, expressing her 
remorse for what she has done and vigorously arguing that she will not 
break the law or hurt her son again. Sonoma County, where the most 
recent offense occurred, has ordered respondent (if she is released) to 
participate in a number of counseling programs in order to see whether 
respondent can be reunited safely with her child. 
Balanced against those factors, however, is the fact that respondent has 
repeatedly decided to address her frustrations and disappointments with 
violence. She assaulted her stepfather, her ex-boyfriend[,] an elderly 
disabled patient who was entrusted to her care, and on many occasions 
her very young child. She said she got physical with this baby “a few 
times a month.” She hit him in the face and caused a bruise under his 
eye. She threw him on the bed and beat him while he screamed. She 
struck him in the temple, an extraordinarily dangerous act, and did so 
with such force that it caused visible swelling and bruising. The victim 
was only twenty months old. 
This was not an isolated incident, but a repeated response to situations 
of stress. The difficulty is that no person can eliminate situations of 
stress from their lives, and this pattern of behavior gives this court 
grave concern that the respondent may act in a violent or dangerous 
way in the future. Of particular concern is the fact that not only has the 
respondent assaulted able-bodied adults, but highly vulnerable persons, 
namely the elderly patient at the nursing home and, with frequency, her 
small child. 
The respondent’s most recent psychological evaluation revealed that 
she had gone through a course of anger management in 2002 along 
with psychotherapy on a weekly basis, but that she had resisted 
previous therapeutic interventions. She “perceived parenting 
instructions as an intrusion and interference with her doing things her 
own way.” The psychologist who interviewed her found “a chronic 
angry undercurrent during the interview as well as some difficulty with 
an overly idiosyncratic way of perceiving. She [respondent] tended to 
distort reality to meet her needs or misidentify the salient aspects of a 
situation. It wasn’t at the level of psychosis, but was at a level that 
would significantly interfere with her ability to accurately perceive and 
cope with everyday life and interactions.” She had no symptoms of 
underlying neurological impairment, but “evidenced very little insight 
regarding her thoughts, feelings and behaviors.” The report states that 
persons with respondent’s psychological profile have “a tendency to act 
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out in an impulsive, aggressive manner, display poor judgment, and do 
not seem to learn from their experiences.” Such persons “often agree to 
treatment to bring about an outcome they desire or avoid some 
consequences, but are likely to terminate their participation in 
interventions before they can have an effect.” The report concludes 
“[o]verall, the prognosis for Ms. Mitrohina benefiting from services is 
poor.” 
. . . 
After considering all relevant factors, this Court finds that the negative 
factors far outweigh the positive in the present case. The respondent 
has not shown that it is in the best interests of the community that she 
remain in the United States. Indeed there is a real concern that she is a 
danger to others. 
One of the more troubling aspects of the immigration judge’s 
decision is that his order essentially was a family law decision to sever 
the parent-child relationship. The denial of Tatyana’s cancellation 
application foreclosed her from following the reunification conditions of 
the state court, thereby making termination of the relationship a fait 
accompli. The sad irony is that had we been able to hit a pause button on 
the removal proceedings and release Tatyana to follow the reunification 
plan (parenting classes, anger management, mental health medication), 
and if she had been able to regain custody of her son or at least make 
clear progress, the outcome of the deportation case might have been 
different once the hearing resumed. The immigration judge’s decision 
blocked these possibilities, even though he lacked the necessary family 
law expertise to make such conclusions. 
Unlike the immigration court, the state superior court was acting in 
one of its areas of expertise in conjunction with the probation 
department. In making their determination, the probation officer and 
state court made their choices, taking into account Tatyana’s criminal 
history and concluding that offering reunification services was 
appropriate. This is important because terminating parental rights is a 
grave matter, and the state’s main concern is the best interest of the child. 
Significantly, reunification services are not to be provided if a parent is 
suffering from a mental disability that renders him or her incapable of 
utilizing those services. In essence, the immigration court decided not to 
defer to the expertise of the state court, instead making its own 
decision—without the benefit of experience or special expertise—to 
determine that it was in the best interests of Tatyana’s child to be taken 
from Tatyana permanently. 
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Tatyana was born in Russia with heart defects and deformed hands.  
“She was rejected by her parents for many years, spending her infancy in 
hospitals and institutions.”  Later she was abused by her parents, then 
abandoned by them. 
She immigrated to the United States as a young teen, adopted by 
U.S. citizens.  After more than a decade, she had a child of her own, 
whom she abused.  Tatyana was diagnosed with mental illness.  
Although she was convicted of child abuse, the state court recommended 
medication, counseling, and a chance to regain custody of her child.  But 
ICE took over, and Tatyana was removed from the country.  
The parent-child relationship was severed.53 
G.  UAC Enforcement Prioritization 
A humanitarian crisis at the border captured the attention of the 
nation last summer.54  As of June 30, 2014 almost 60,000 
unaccompanied alien children from Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Mexico reached the southern U.S. border.55  By the end of 2014, a 
total of 90,000 was expected.56 
The sharp increase has generated tremendous media coverage and 
speculation by elected officials and others about the reasons. However, 
many of the explanations are overly simplistic.  Some say this surge is 
the result of immigration reform promises or administrative reforms in 
enforcement that sent encouraging signals to Central Americans, 
suggesting that they may enjoy a “de facto amnesty” if they get across 
the Mexico border.  Others said the children are being drawn by rumors 
about special protections for migrant children by the Administration, and 
point to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program 
announced in 2012. 
In reality, the problem is enormously complex.  The Women’s 
Refugee Commission found through interviews with 151 such youth that 
their migration arose out of longstanding, complex problems in their 
                                                          
 53.  Id.  
 54.  See, e.g., Editorial, The New Crisis at the Border: Undocumented and Unaccompanied 
Minors, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-immigration-
minors-20140615-story.html. 
 55.  Lauren Shapiro and Eugene Kiely, Surge of “Unaccompanied Children,” FACTCHECK.ORG 
(July 18, 2014), http://www.factcheck.org/2014/07/surge-of-unaccompanied-children/. 
 56.  The Author’s analysis of UAC Enforcement Prioritization accompanying footnotes 56 
through 57 was previously published in Bill Ong Hing, Playing Politics With the Lives of Unaccom-
panied Alien Children, HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-ong-
hing/playing-politics-with-the-unaccompanied-aliens_b_5530766.html.  
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home countries—that is, the growing influence of youth gangs and drug 
cartels, targeting of youth by gangs and police, gender based violence, 
rising poverty, and continuing unemployment. Over 77 percent of the 
participants stated violence was the main reason more children were 
fleeing their countries. 
Violence in the home countries is a definite factor.  Honduras, where 
the largest numbers of unaccompanied minors are coming from, has 
become one of the most dangerous countries in the world.  In 2011, 
Honduras became the country with the highest murder rate in the world.  
Homicide rates in El Salvador are only marginally lower than in 
Honduras, with 66 individuals killed for every 10,000 inhabitants. 
Children are at a greater risk of gang violence.  Collaboration 
between drug cartels and gangs has led to a significant increase in 
violence, with children and teens being the primary targets. According 
the University of Democracy, Peace and Security, 920 Honduran 
children were murdered between January and March of 2012.  In El 
Salvador, gangs have increasingly targeted children at their schools, 
resulting in El Salvador having one of the lowest school attendance rates 
in Latin America. 
Human and drug trafficking is occurring.  Due to the influence of 
cartels in Mexico and at the border, the current migratory experience is 
very much connected with human and drug trafficking.  The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 
organized criminal groups coerce children into prostitution and to work 
as hit men, lookouts, and drug mules.  Drug traffickers may target minors 
in their home country and force them to traffic drugs across the border 
and once they are in the United States.  Because these youth often travel 
alone and are escaping death in their home countries, they are often faced 
with no choice but to carry drugs or work for drug cartels in order to 
across sic the border.  Gang and drug trafficking in Central America are 
also increasingly recruiting girls to smuggle and sell drugs in their home 
countries, using gang rape as a means of forcing them into compliance.  
Many gangs are targeting younger girls, some as young as nine-years-
old, for rape and sexual assault.  Gangs also use the threat of rape as a 
tactic to gain money through extortion and kidnapping.57 
                                                          
 57.  Id.  
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1.  Detention of Unaccompanied Children 
The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), a branch of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, is the federal agency 
responsible for the care and custody of unaccompanied children.58  Under 
the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2008, unaccompanied, children from non-contiguous countries 
must be transferred to ORR custody within 72 hours of their arrest.59  For 
several years, ORR has operated temporary shelters throughout the 
United States to house children while ORR caseworkers sought to 
reunify them with family members or family friends in the United 
States.60  In response to the dramatic increase in numbers of children 
apprehended by Customs and Border Patrol, ORR opened three large 
facilities housed on military bases: Joint Base San Antonio – Lackland in 
San Antonio, TX; Fort Sill Army Base in Oklahoma and Port Hueneme 
Naval Base in Ventura, California.61  Advocates had raised significant 
concerns about the conditions in which children were held at these 
facilities and the difficulty attorneys and legal workers had in gaining 
access due to security procedures at these military facilities.62  
2.  Detention of Families 
In a change in policy, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
began detaining families apprehended at the border, rather than releasing 
them from custody to appear for removal proceedings at a later 
date.63  ICE opened a family detention center in Artesia, New Mexico, in 
late June 201464 and opened a second family detention center in Dilley, 
Texas, in December.65  Advocates soon reported serious due process 
concerns regarding the way in which cases were being handled in 
Artesia.66  Concerns also were raised about how credible fear screening 
                                                          
 58.  Sarah Bronstein, Update on Unaccompanied Children and Families, CATHOLIC LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, Aug. 2014, https://www.cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-clinic/update-
unaccompanied-children-and-families-august-2014. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
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interviews for asylum were being conducted.67  These interviews 
determine whether the adult family member will be given the opportunity 
to have her asylum claim heard before an immigration judge.68  Other 
problem areas include hearings being conducted remotely via video 
teleconferencing and lack of access to counsel.69  
A message from a pro bono attorney who traveled to assist detainees 
in Artesia contains typical observations: 
On average our days in Artesia ran from 5:30am to 1:30am, logging in 
around 4 hours of sleep a day.  We entered the facility in the cool dawn 
hours and left at dusk.  In between those hours, when we would step 
out of the attorney trailer or the court trailer to move between trailers, 
the bright sun and the bland backdrop of the white trailers that 
comprise the detention center and the neutral Southwest landscape were 
blinding.  After leaving the detention center, we went to the church to 
meet together to troubleshoot cases, receive updates, and doll [sic] out 
the next day’s cases and workload.  After the group meeting, we would 
begin preparing our cases for the next day. 
Our team filled a variety of roles.  At the detention center, some of us 
would meet with women and kids in the attorney trailer to prepare their 
cases.  The list of these consultations was on average around 
60.  Others would be in court representing the women in their bond and 
asylum hearings in two court dockets that averaged around 15 cases a 
court.  Still others would stay behind at the community church to 
prepare innumerable filings.  
The women we saw were mostly from El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras.  They were all fleeing either gang or domestic violence or 
both.  They shared stories of kidnapping, rape, abuse, extortion and 
threats.  The weight that these women carry is profound.  Most of the 
women came to the attorney trailer for consultations with their children.  
They often have to recount these horrific stories of rape, domestic 
violence, abuse, and other threats within earshot of their children.  We 
would do our best to remove the children during these moments, but 
even separating mom from child(ren) was cruel in itself.  As a 
distraction, ICE would put on a children’s video and tear out pages of 
coloring books and give the children crayons that they have to return 
when they leave the legal trailer. 
Most of the children had coughs, some had sores on their faces, one kid 
had a growth on his face.  There have been chicken pox outbreaks here, 
leading to quarantines.  Many of the children who are old enough to be 
weaned from bottles have regressed to bottles. Some moms reported 
                                                          
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
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their children were sleeping for distressingly long hours.  I read 
medical records of a 5 year old reporting to the clinic here that 
expressed that his level of pain was between 7 to 8 on a scale of 10. 
We heard that some of the little boys have started to pretend they are 
ICE agents, mimicking them at count (when the guards count the 
detainees to confirm that everyone is still there). 
Another disturbing observation from our team is how quiet the kids are 
in Artesia.  All day we are surrounded by them either in our 
consultation area in the detention center or in court.  They all seem so 
sedated and low energy.  I spent two days working with one mother and 
her 16 month old.  The child’s face was always tear-stained and yet he 
never made a peep or fussed.70  
3.  The Use of “Rocket Dockets” 
Another significant development is the implementation of expedited 
removal proceedings, so-called “rocket dockets,” for unaccompanied 
children and families who have been [recently] released from 
custody.71  Relatives or close family friends can sponsor children in order 
to have them released from custody. Their deportation cases are then 
transferred to the immigration court near the relative or family friend. 
Rocket dockets have been rolled out in immigration courts across the 
country.72 Children and families have been given as little as three days’ 
notice of their court hearing date, severely limiting their ability to find 
counsel.73  Continuances (periods of time in between hearings) are being 
granted for very short periods of time – in some instances as little as a 
week – to find an attorney.74 
On July 22, 2014, Dana Leigh Marks, President of the National 
Association of Immigration Judges, sent a letter to Sen. Harry Reid, U.S. 
Senate Majority Leader, and Sen. Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senate 
Minority Leader, expressing “serious concerns” about immigration 
judges’ caseloads and the use of expedited procedures in children’s 
cases.75Coordinated efforts by service providers to respond to the rocket 
                                                          
 70.  Helen Lawrence, Artesia On Our Minds—An Immigration Attorney’s Diary of a Detention 
Camp, SILICON VALLEY DE-BUG (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.siliconvalleydebug 
.org/articles/2014/10/21/artesia-my-mind. 
 71.  Sarah Bronstein, Update on Unaccompanied Children and Families, CATHOLIC LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION NETWORK (Aug. 2014), https://www.cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-clinic/update-
unaccompanied-children-and-families-august-2014. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
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dockets in many parts of the country have helped, but the stress and 
pressure on these providers has been immense.76  Some jurisdictions, 
including the State of California and San Francisco County, have tried to 
help by appropriating funds for community organizations to hire 
additional staff.77 
4.  Revisions to Credible Fear Standards 
As the surge in UACs began in early 2014, USCIS—whose asylum 
office handles asylum cases—revised its Lesson Plan for officers on how 
to determine whether asylum applicants who make it to the border meet 
the credible fear screening standard.78  The new credible fear standards 
are quite misleading and inappropriate.  The language and tone instruct 
asylum officers to impose a burden on applicants79 that surpasses the 
well-founded fear standard established by the Supreme Court in INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca,80 when in fact the actual standard should be more 
deferential than the well-founded fear standard. 
As the Lesson Plan correctly points out, the function of credible fear 
screening is “to quickly identify potentially meritorious claims to 
protection and to resolve frivolous ones with dispatch. . . . If an alien 
passes this threshold-screening standard, [the] claim for protection . . . 
will be further examined by an immigration judge. . . .”81  This is 
consistent with the statutory structure. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), if “the 
alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of 
                                                          
 76.  Lauren Roberts & Renée Schomp, The Longest Hug Ever, ONEJUSTICE BLOG (Dec. 12, 
2014), https://www.onejusticeblog.wordpress.com/category/pro-bono-services-to-help-californians-
in-need/. 
 77.  Alex Dobuzinskis, California sets up fund for legal representation of immigrant children, 
REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/28/us-usa-immigration-
california-idUSKCN0HN00B20140928; Elise Foley, San Francisco Supervisors Vote To Provide 
Lawyers For Kids Facing Deportation, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.huff 
ingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/san-francisco-immigrants_n_5836230.html.  
 78.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES – RAIO, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER 
TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR 44 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www.cmsny.org/wp-
content/uploads/credible-fear-of-persecution-and-torture.pdf [hereinafter THE LESSON PLAN]; USCIS 
Amends Credible Fear Lesson Plans, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, 
https://www.cliniclegal.org/resources/uscis-amends-credible-fear-lesson-plans (last visited May 25, 
2015). 
 79.  THE LESSON PLAN, supra note 78, at 44 (establishing that “[i]n order to establish a credible 
fear of persecution or torture, the applicant must show a ‘significant possibility’ that he or she could 
establish eligibility for asylum”).  
 80.  480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987) (“the ‘well-founded fear’ standard governs eligibility for asy-
lum”). 
 81.  THE LESSON PLAN, supra note 78, at 11 (citing Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8479 (Feb. 19, 1999)). 
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persecution, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum 
officer.”82 Then if the asylum “officer determines at the time of the 
interview that an alien has a credible fear of persecution . . . the alien 
shall be detained for further consideration of the application for 
asylum.”83  Thus, the credible fear process clearly is a screening process 
for potentially meritorious asylum claims versus frivolous ones.  
Structurally and explicitly, the alien certainly does not need to establish 
the asylum claim at this point; a potentially meritorious claim at this 
juncture is all that is necessary.84 
Thus, the standard and burden for credible fear—a threshold 
screening stage—must be lower than establishing an actual meritorious 
claim for asylum.  At this credible fear review, the asylum officer can 
only screen out frivolous claims.85 
Since the standard for credible fear is structurally less rigorous than 
the standard for asylum, in order to adequately appreciate and grasp the 
correct credible fear standard, one must know what the standard is for 
asylum.  In order to qualify for asylum, the applicant must meet the 
definition of refugee set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1101, by establishing “a 
well-founded fear of persecution.”86  In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the 
Supreme Court explained the well-founded fear standard: “[S]o long as 
an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be 
shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is 
enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility” in order to qualify 
for asylum.87  In fact, “10% chance of [persecution may be sufficient to 
establish] well-founded fear . . . . [I]t is enough that persecution is a 
reasonable possibility.”88  Clearly, the applicant is not required to prove 
that it is more likely than not he or she will be persecuted.89  The 
                                                          
 82.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2014).  
 83.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 84.  See THE LESSON PLAN, supra note 78, at 11 (explaining that the interviewing officer need 
only find a “credible” fear of persecution to continue the interview process).  
 85.  See id.  
 86.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
 87.  Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.  
 88.  Id. (“There is simply no room in the United Nations’ definition for concluding that because 
an applicant has only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or 
she has no ‘well-founded fear’”).  
 89.  Prior to Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court held that the “more likely than not” standard 
of persecution did apply to the “clear probability” standard for withholding of deportation.  INS v. 
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984).  Cardoza-Fonseca provided the Supreme Court the opportunity to 
explain for the first time that the well-founded fear standard for asylum was intended to be more 
generous than the withholding standard.  See 480 U.S. at 425–26; the two provisions were located in 
two different parts of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  See id. at 432 (discussing the two stand-
ards).  
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applicant is not required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he or she will not be persecuted.90  In fact, the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Cardoza-Fonseca requires a very low standard of proof for 
asylum.91  This makes sense, given the humanitarian purpose of asylum 
and what is at stake if an incorrect decision denying asylum is made.  In 
essence, the benefit of the doubt is given to the applicant.  An “applicant 
for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a 
reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution.”92 
Thus, since we know that the asylum standard is low, requiring only 
a “10% chance” or a “reasonable possibility” of persecution, we know 
intuitively that the credible fear-screening hurdle must be even lower.  
Instructions suggesting anything more are therefore incorrect and 
misguided.  Therein lies the problem with the Lesson Plan, whose tenor, 
format, and content suggests too high a burden for credible fear. 
Here are some examples of specific problems with the Lesson Plan: 
Throughout the text, the Lesson Plan points out that credible fear of 
persecution means that there is a “significant possibility” that the alien 
can establish eligibility for asylum.93  However, this is done without 
regular acknowledgement and reminder that establishing eligibility for 
asylum, i.e., well-founded fear, is a relatively low threshold when 
compared to other burdens of proof such as preponderance of the 
evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt.  Without that reminder or 
acknowledgement, the officer is left with the words “significant 
possibility” which connote a high burden.  In fact, it is a burden that 
could possibly require less than a 10% likelihood of persecution.94 
The Lesson Plan contains this guidance: The applicant bears the 
burden of proof to establish a credible fear of persecution or torture. This 
means that the applicant must produce sufficiently convincing evidence 
that establishes the facts of the case, and that those facts must meet the 
relevant legal standard.95 
The italicized language suggests an incorrect standard.  The language 
suggests that each and every fact must be established by convincing 
                                                          
 90.  See id. at 431 (stating that the fear must be “well-founded” which could be less than a 50% 
chance).  
 91.  Id. (explaining that to be granted asylum, the alien need only meet the definition of a refu-
gee, which requires only a well-founded fear of persecution).  
 92.  See In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987). 
 93.  See THE LESSON PLAN, supra note 78, at 12. 
 94.  See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440 (describing the low threshold for “well-founded” 
fear).   
 95.  THE LESSON PLAN, supra note 78, at 12 (emphasis added).  
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evidence.96  That language suggests the inapplicable preponderance 
standard.97  That high standard is not even required for asylum,98 so it 
certainly cannot be the proper standard for credible fear that should be 
much lower. 
Citing INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), the Lesson Plan says that the 
applicant’s testimony is sufficient only if “credible, is persuasive, and 
refers to specific facts.”99  This part of the Lesson Plan goes on: 
Therefore, the terms ‘persuasive’ and ‘specific facts’ must have 
independent meaning above and beyond the first term ‘credible.’  An 
applicant may be credible, but nonetheless fail to satisfy his or her 
burden to establish the required elements of eligibility.  ‘Specific facts’ 
are distinct from statements of belief. When assessing the probative 
value of an applicant’s testimony, the asylum officer must distinguish 
between fact and opinion testimony and determine how much weight to 
assign to each of the two forms of testimony.100 
This statement and citation to INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) comes under 
the specific part of the Lesson Plan labeled: “V. BURDEN OF PROOF 
AND STANDARD OF PROOF FOR CREDIBLE FEAR 
DETERMINATIONS.”101  This is a serious error. In fact, INA § 
208(b)(1)(B)(ii) falls in the section of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act that pertains to the burden of proof for asylum, not credible fear.102  
Thus, the Lesson Plan incorrectly instructs that the same burden of proof 
for asylum applies to credible fear.  The clear and incorrect lesson 
conveyed to the officer is that the credible fear applicant must meet an 
eligibility requirement that in fact does not apply.103 
Recognizing credible fear is not a grant of asylum.104  It merely 
recognizes that the person has shown a significant possibility that that the 
                                                          
 96.  See id. (requiring “sufficiently convincing evidence”).  
 97.  See id. (stating that the applicant bears the “burden” and must present “convincing evi-
dence”).  
 98.  See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440 (discussing the relatively low threshold for estab-
lishing “well-founded” fear). 
 99.  THE LESSON PLAN, supra note 78, at 13.   
 100.  See id. 
 101.  See id. at 12–13. 
 102.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2014). 
 103.  See THE LESSON PLAN, supra note 78, at 12, (indicating that the standard of proof for cred-
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timony); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 (1987) (explaining how the attorney 
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founded” fear, before they may be granted asylum.  Thus a well-founded fear is merely the first re-
quirement).  
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applicant can meet the less-than-preponderance standard for asylum 
before an immigration judge.105  As such, the credible fear standard is 
quite low.  A credible fear finding simply gives the person a chance for a 
fair hearing in an immigration court.106  Credible fear requires less than a 
one in ten chance that persecution is likely107 —something that the new 
Lesson Plan fails to teach.108 
Those who come to our borders seeking asylum deserve fair 
treatment.  This administration should not be associated with the tragic 
asylum eras of the past.109  Politics should not get in the way.  The entire 
content of the Lesson Plan should be reconsidered so that asylum seekers 
are treated fairly at this screening stage.  If they meet the correct, 
contextualized credible fear standard, they should be allowed to make a 
case for asylum in front of an immigration judge where all the nuances of 
asylum law can be fairly evaluated.  Given the likely manifestations of 
PTSD, complications in assessing credibility, possible challenges with 
translation, and other logistical challenges, the screening function of 
credible fear determinations is most correctly viewed as one of deference 
to the applicant.  The integrity of the asylum system should be protected 
by suspending the new Lesson Plan and installing one that more 
accurately reflects the statutory framework as well as the purpose and 
minimal legal requirements that attach to credible fear determinations. 
H.  Family Separation 
Felipe Calderon is not unlike many natives of Mexico who are living 
in the United States without proper documents.110  Calderon was born in 
1955 in a small town in the state of Guanajuato, Mexico.  He grew up 
poor—often lacking food, clothing, and housing.  He attended the local 
elementary school through the third grade—the highest level of 
education that the hometown elementary school offered.  He then 
                                                          
 105.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(iv)(describing the procedure for considering an asylum applica-
tion); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431  (“That the fear must be “well-founded” does not 
alter the obvious focus on the individual’s subjective beliefs, nor does it transform the standard into 
a ‘more likely than not’ one.”). 
 106.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5) (describing the procedure for considering an asylum application). 
 107.  Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440. 
 108.  See THE LESSON PLAN, supra note 78, at 13. 
 109.  See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990); Haitian Refugee 
Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 
760 F.Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).   
110.   Material accompanying footnotes 110 through 111 is Author’s analysis of Family Separation 
as  previously published in Bill Ong Hing, The Failure of Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deporta-
tion of Oscar Martinez, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 437, 446–49 (2013). 
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attended three more years of school in a town that was five kilometers 
away, walking two hours each way because the family could not afford 
to pay for the van ride.  As the oldest child, he had to stop school and 
begin working by age eleven to help put food on the table. 
Mr. Calderon’s hometown—Valle de Santiago—only had about five 
hundred residents, and the only work available was in the agricultural 
fields.  Some years later, his father decided to try his luck in Mexico City 
to earn more money.  Mr. Calderon and two of his brothers, who also left 
school at an early age to help work, remained in Valle de Santiago to 
work in the fields.  In 1975, the entire family moved to Mexico City to 
join their father, where Mr. Calderon found work in a stationery store 
making minimum wage—more than what he made in the fields. 
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Calderon met Laura Gomez and fell in love.  
After three years of dating, they decided to get married and form their 
own family.  Even after marrying, Mr. Calderon still felt he had an 
obligation to help his parents and siblings with expenses, so he continued 
to share part of his salary with them.  His dream was to build a house 
with his wife and raise children in an environment where they could 
obtain a good education—an environment very different from his own 
childhood.  Unfortunately, the couple learned that Laura was unable to 
have children, but they continued to strive for their dream of earning 
enough money to build a home.  However, good work became difficult to 
find even though expenses were climbing. 
Like so many others, Mr. Calderon looked to the United States to 
pursue his dream.  In 1985, he entered with his father-in-law, looking for 
work in Oakland, California.  He soon found work as a potato packer for 
a produce company earning only $120 per week.  Six months later, he 
found a better job working the graveyard shift from 11 PM to 7 AM in 
the kitchen of a Holiday Inn (later purchased by Hilton Hotel).  Mr. 
Calderon worked the graveyard shift for ten years.  By working hard, Mr. 
Calderon was given the opportunity to work the day shift, and he 
maintained that shift until August 2007, when he was arrested by ICE.  
Although the pay was modest, the job provided medical benefits.  In 
addition to working at the hotel, Mr. Calderon worked part time at a 
pizza parlor to supplement his income.  In total, he averaged sixty-eight 
to seventy-two hours of work a week to provide for his family’s needs.  
When the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled against him in 
2010, Mr. Calderon had worked in the hotel kitchen for almost twenty-
five years. 
After his first trip to the United States, Mr. Calderon returned to 
Mexico a couple of times.  His last entry was in 1987 with his first wife 
Laura, and he resided in the United States continuously since then.  In 
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September 1993, they decided to buy a house in Oakland, with the idea 
that they would adopt a child in the future.  Both continued working, but 
in 1994 Laura began getting sick.  Her illness became so debilitating that 
after a while she had to stop working.  Doctors discovered a problem that 
affected Laura’s lungs and heart, which caused her to suffer a great deal.  
Sadly, Laura died in January 1995. 
The loss of Laura changed Mr. Calderon completely.  He was alone 
in the United States. He did not want his parents or siblings to come to 
the United States because of the difficulties and dangers of crossing the 
border.  This was a painful period for him, having lost his wife of 
seventeen years.  Mr. Calderon took refuge in his work; he also played 
baseball to take his mind off the tragedy. 
After some time, his friends suggested that Mr. Calderon look for a 
new partner so he would not be alone.  He was doubtful that he could 
find someone who would understand his situation and state of mind.  
However, a couple he knew told him about another friend whose spouse 
also had passed away.  They told Mr. Calderon about Juana, who was 
now alone with two young children and also needed companionship.  Mr. 
Calderon was interested in meeting Juana, especially because she had 
two children. 
Mr. Calderon and Juana were introduced and they eventually married 
in March 1996.  He treated Juana’s two children Donaldo and Lorena 
like his own; they were quite young when he became their stepfather.  
They felt so fortunate to have been brought together when each was in 
such great pain and need. They truly felt that they were brought together 
through divine intervention. 
Unfortunately, ICE arrested Mr. Calderon while working in the hotel 
kitchen and placed him in removal proceedings.  At his deportation 
hearing, Mr. Calderon applied for cancellation of removal, and his 
attorney introduced strong supporting documents from Mr. Calderon’s 
friends and neighbors that describe him as a humble, caring, and well-
respected member of the community. 
Mr. Calderon and his second wife successfully integrated into the 
community and established roots.  Mr. Calderon was a good neighbor, a 
good worker, and a regular churchgoer.  He was the godfather to a 
disabled boy, and participated in church and community events.  
Reverend A.M., executive director of a local church organizing group, 
noted that Mr. Calderon and his family “participated in many community 
activities in our organization . . . . [W]e [sic] are grateful for their 
leadership, responsibility, and commitment to the community.” 
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Mr. Calderon’s commitment to the community extended beyond 
religious boundaries.  Mr. L.A., a union representative, wrote that Mr. 
Calderon “has been an active Union member . . . for 22 years.  He has 
always helped his co-workers with problems, attended Union meetings, 
and worked together with management to resolve any issues as they 
came up.”  Mr. Calderon also was deeply involved in PTA meetings, 
school activities, and community athletic and cultural programs.  Other 
parents in the community expressed, “Mr. [Calderon] is an active, 
honest, respectful, and quietly supportive member of our community 
soccer programs.  He and his wife are truly role models for his children 
as well as their teammates.”  Mr. Calderon’s service to the community 
through many outlets has made him a role model for other children and 
adults.  For example, parents in the community have described Mr. 
Calderon as “a very responsible person, dedicated to the well-being of 
his family, deeply involved in community and family activities, PTA 
meetings, school reunions[,] and church issues.”  The PTA Council 
President expressed, “I feel strongly that Mr. [Calderon] is a stabilizing 
factor in our community.  We need more men like him, who are loyal 
and loving to their families.” 
Another Berkeley parent noted:  
[Y]ear after year, [Mr. Calderon] volunteered with me in events held 
for the local church and Berkeley Unified School District where our 
children attended.  As part of his nature, [Mr. Calderon] goes out of his 
way to motivate our Latino population and even organizes cultural 
celebrations at our church and local senior centers. 
The evidence was strong enough for the immigration judge to grant 
Mr. Calderon’s application for cancellation, but the government 
appealed, and the BIA reversed on the grounds that the “Immigration 
Judge erred in concluding the respondent met his burden in establishing 
the requisite hardship.”  The BIA felt that neither U.S. citizen children 
“suffered from any health issues,” or “showed compelling educational 
needs.”  Regarding Lorena, the BIA held the possibility that she “may 
not be able to complete her college education” due to Mr. Calderon’s 
removal did not constitute an “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship.”  Nor did the evidence regarding Felipe Jr. establish for the 
BIA that he would “suffer hardship which is substantially beyond what 
would ordinarily be expected as a result of the respondent’s removal.” 
A month prior to Mr. Calderon’s removal, I asked the local ICE 
director to grant deferred action to Mr. Calderon based on prosecutorial 
discretion instructions from the ICE director in Washington, D.C.  His 
response was a flat rejection: 
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The June 17 and August 18 memos and announcements from D.C. 
didn’t say anything new that I have not already been doing; they didn’t 
change anything; they didn’t change my marching orders; 25 years 
residence doesn’t mean anything; [Calderon] just happened to be under 
the radar.  The public expects us to enforce immigration laws. No one 
has told me the [Calderon] case is a low priority case; resources have 
always been expended on these kinds of cases.  I also won’t consider an 
extension of time for him to attend [Lorena]’s graduation.  If I did that, 
then what about the next kid? 111 
III.  DISRUPTION OF UNFAIR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
A.  Impact Litigation 
When enforcement of immigration laws results in outcomes that we 
regard as unfair, inappropriate, or unjust, immigrants and their allies rely 
on a range of strategies or tools to challenge the results or the processes 
that lead to those results.  Conventionally, those strategies include impact 
litigation and legislative advocacy.  Many examples of those strategies 
demonstrate disruption of immigration enforcement or unreasonable 
immigration policies. 
Impact litigation examples in the immigrant rights area abound.  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit opinion in Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh 
reveals that immigration officials engaged in a strategy that foreclosed 
the opportunity to apply for asylum for Salvadorans during the 1980s.112 
Generally, after aliens were apprehended, either border patrol agents 
or INS officers processed them.113  INS processing of detained aliens 
consisted of an interrogation combined with the completion of various 
forms, including form I-213, Record of Deportable Alien, and the 
presentation of form I-274 Request for Voluntary Departure.  Although 
the arrested Salvadorans were eligible to apply for political asylum and 
to request a deportation hearing prior to their departure from the United 
States, the vast majority of Salvadorans apprehended signed voluntary 
departure agreements that commenced a summary removal process.  
Once a person signed for voluntary departure in the course of INS 
processing, he or she was subject to removal from the United States as 
soon as transportation could be arranged.  A person given administrative 
                                                          
 111.  Id.  
 112.  919 F.2d 549, 559 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining finding of facts which “revealed a pattern 
and practice of interference and coercion on the part of INS agents which prevented Salvadoran al-
iens who feared return to their country from exercising their right to apply for asylum”). 
 113.  Material accompanying footnotes 113 through 114 is Author’s analysis of Impact Litiga-
tion as  previously published in HING, supra note 15, at 185–88.  
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voluntary departure in this manner never had a deportation hearing, the 
only forum before which the detained person could seek political asylum 
and mandatory withholding of deportation at the time. 
The Orantes-Hernandez court found that the widespread acceptance 
of voluntary departure was due in large part to the coercive effects of the 
practices and procedures employed by INS and the unfamiliarity of most 
Salvadorans with their rights under United States immigration laws.  INS 
agents directed, intimidated, or coerced Salvadorans in custody, who had 
no expressed desire to return to El Salvador, to sign form I-274 for 
voluntary departure.  INS agents used a variety of techniques to procure 
voluntary departure, ranging from subtle persuasion to outright threats 
and misrepresentations.  Many Salvadorans were intimidated or coerced 
to accept voluntary departure even when they had unequivocally 
expressed a fear of returning to El Salvador.  Even when an individual 
refused to sign form I-274, “Waiver of Rights,” INS officers felt that 
they could present the person with the voluntary departure form. 
The court also found that INS processing officers engaged in a 
pattern and practice of misrepresenting the meaning of political asylum 
and of giving improper and incomplete legal advice, which denied 
arrested Salvadorans meaningful understanding of the options presented 
and discouraged them from exercising available rights.  INS officers and 
agents routinely advised Salvadorans of the negative aspects of choosing 
a deportation hearing without informing them of the positive options that 
were available.  Without informing them that voluntary departure could 
be requested at a deportation hearing, INS officers advised detainees that 
if they did not sign for voluntary departure they could be formally 
deported from the United States, and that such a deportation would 
preclude their legal re-entry without the permission of the Attorney 
General.  
INS officers and agents routinely told Salvadoran detainees that if 
they applied for asylum they would remain in detention for a long time, 
without mentioning the possibility of release on bond.  Similarly, without 
advising that an immigration judge could lower the bond amount and that 
there were bond agencies that could provide assistance, INS agents 
regularly told detainees that if they did not sign for voluntary departure 
they would remain detained until bond was posted.  Some agents told 
individuals the monetary bond amount they could expect or the bond 
amount given to other Salvadorans, without telling them that the bond 
amount ultimately depended upon the circumstances of the individual. 
INS officers commonly told detainees that if they applied for asylum, 
the application would be denied, or that Salvadorans did not get asylum.  
INS officers and agents represented that Salvadorans ultimately would be 
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deported regardless of the asylum application.  INS officers and agents 
misrepresented the eligibility for asylum by saying that it was only given 
to guerillas or to soldiers.  INS processing agents or officers further 
discouraged Salvadorans from applying for asylum by telling them that 
the information on the application would be sent to El Salvador.  INS 
processing officers also used the threat of transfer to remote locations as 
a means of discouraging detained Salvadorans from exercising their 
rights to a hearing and to pursuing asylum claims.  
Furthermore, INS agents often did not allow Salvadorans to consult 
with counsel prior to signing the voluntary departure forms, although 
they acknowledged that aliens had this right.  Even those Salvadorans 
fortunate enough to secure legal representation were often unable to 
avoid voluntary departure, as INS’ practice was to refuse to recognize the 
authority of counsel until a formal notice of representation (Form G-28) 
was filed.  Due to the rapid processing of Salvadoran detainees, it was 
often physically impossible for counsel to locate their clients and file 
Form G-28 before the client was removed from the country.114 
The Orantes-Hernandez court noted: 
The record before this Court establishes that INS engages in a pattern 
and practice of pressuring or intimidating Salvadorans who remain 
detained after the issuance of an OSC [Order to Show Cause] to request 
voluntary departure or voluntary deportation to El Salvador.  There is 
substantial evidence of INS detention officers urging, cajoling, and 
using friendly persuasion to pressure Salvadorans to recant their 
requests for a hearing and to return voluntarily to El Salvador. 
That this conduct is officially condoned, even in the face of complaints, 
demonstrates that it is a de facto policy. The existence of a policy of 
making daily announcements about the availability of voluntary 
departure, coupled with the acknowledgement that the policy is 
designed to free-up scarce detention space, supports the conclusion that 
INS detention officers make a practice of pressuring detained 
Salvadorans to return to El Salvador. This conduct is not the result of 
isolated transgressions by a few overzealous officers, but, in fact, is a 
widespread and pervasive practice akin to a policy. 
This pattern of misconduct flows directly from the attitudes and 
misconceptions of INS officers and their superiors as to the merits of 
Salvadoran asylum claims and the motives of class members who flee 
El Salvador and enter this country.115 
                                                          
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F.Supp. 1488, 1505 (C.D. Cal 1988), aff’d sub nom. 
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Thus, the district court order was affirmed: 
 
1. [INS and border patrol agents] shall not employ threats, 
misrepresentation, subterfuge or other forms of coercion, or in any 
other way attempt to persuade or dissuade class members when 
informing them of the availability of voluntary departure pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b). The prohibited acts include, but are not limited to: 
(a)  Misrepresenting the meaning of political asylum and giving 
improper and incomplete legal advice to detained class members;  
(b) Telling class members that if they apply for asylum they will 
remain in detention for a long period of time, without mentioning the 
possibility of release on bond or indicating that bond can be lowered by 
an immigration judge and that there are bond agencies which can 
provide assistance; 
(c) Telling Salvadoran detainees the amount of bond given to other 
class members, without indicating that the bond amount ultimately 
depends upon the circumstances of the individual class member;  
 
(d) Telling class members that their asylum applications will be denied, 
that Salvadorans do not get asylum, or that asylum is only available to 
guerillas or soldiers; 
(e) Representing to class members that the information on the asylum 
application will be sent to El Salvador; 
(f) Representing to class members that asylum applicants will never be 
able to return to El Salvador; 
(g) Indicating that Salvadoran detainees will be transferred to remote 
locations if they do not elect voluntary departure;  
(h) Advising Salvadorans of the negative aspects of choosing a 
deportation hearing without informing them of the positive options that 
are available;  
 
(i) Refusing to allow class members to contact an attorney; and  
 
(j) Making daily announcements at detention facilities of the 
availability of voluntary departure.116 
                                                          
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 116.   Id. at 1511. 
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The bias that INS officials and asylum corps officers exhibited 
toward both Guatemalan and Salvadoran asylum applicants was further 
exposed in American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh.117  As the New 
York Times reported on the case: 
Such applications have long presented the Government with an 
embarrassing choice. The United States supports the Governments of 
El Salvador and Guatemala, and at the same time it is asked by asylum 
applicants to find that they have a “well-founded fear of persecution” if 
they are returned home. Every approval of an application for political 
asylum thus amounts to an admission that the United States is aiding 
governments that violate the civil rights of their own citizens. 
Since 1980 the Government has denied 97 percent of applications for 
political asylum by El Salvadorans and 99 percent of those by 
Guatemalans. During the same time, applications for political asylum 
by Eastern Europeans, Nicaraguans and residents of other countries 
have a high percentage of approval. For example, 76 percent of 
applications by residents of the Soviet Union were approved, as were 
64 percent of those by residents of China.118  
A settlement was reached requiring the INS to readjudicate the 
asylum claims of certain Salvadorans and Guatemalans who were present 
in the United States as of 1990, and who had sought immigration 
benefits.119  The case, known as the “ABC litigation” began in 1985 as a 
nationwide class action on behalf of Salvadorans and Guatemalans.120  
The plaintiffs alleged that the INS and the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review were biased in their asylum adjudication process for 
those two nationalities.121  Under the settlement, these Central Americans 
were eligible for new asylum interviews.122 
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,123 the Fifth Circuit chastised the 
federal government for unfair processes that were imposed on Haitian 
asylum applicants.124  In response to the repressive Duvalier regime that 
caused political and economic havoc in Haiti in the 1970s, many Haitians 
                                                          
 117.  760 F.Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 118.  Katherine Bishop, U.S. Adopts New Policy for Hearings On Political Asylum for Some Al-
iens, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/20/us/us-adopts-new-policy-
for-hearings-on-political-asylum-for-some-aliens.html. 
 119. American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 810 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 120.  See id. at 799.  
 121.  See id.  
 122.  See id.  
 123.  676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 124.  Id. at 1031–32. 
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fled to the United States seeking refuge.125  Large numbers sought 
asylum once they reached the shores of Florida.126  A backlog developed, 
so INS officials implemented an accelerated program to deal with the 
situation.127 
The program of accelerated processing to which the [Haitians were] 
subjected by the INS-termed the “Haitian Program”- embodied the 
government’s response to the tremendous backlog of Haitian deportation 
cases that had accumulated in the INS Miami district office by the 
summer of 1978.128  By June of that year between six and seven thousand 
unprocessed Haitian deportation cases were pending in the Miami office.  
These staggering numbers were not the result of a massive influx of 
Haitians to south Florida over a short period.  Although significant 
numbers of Haitians had entered the United States from Haiti and the 
Bahamas in the spring of 1978, the backlog was primarily attributable to 
a slow trickle of Haitians over a ten-year period and to the confessed 
inaction of the INS in dealing with these aliens. 
 Many officials provided input in the planning process of the Haitian 
project.  Assigned by [the Deputy Commissioner of the INS] with the 
task of assessing the Haitian situation in Miami, INS Regional 
Commissioner Armand J. Salturelli submitted the recommendation, 
among others, that processing could be expedited by ceasing the practice 
of suspending deportation hearings upon the making of an asylum claim.  
Salturelli acknowledged that this would contravene internal operations 
procedures, but suggested that those procedures should be cancelled or 
“at least be suspended insofar as Haitians are concerned.” One July 1978 
report from the Intelligence Division of INS to the Associate Director of 
Enforcement advised in absolute terms that the Haitians were ‘economic’ 
and not political refugees and, in belated recognition of the obvious, 
warned the Enforcement Division that favorable treatment of these 
Haitians would encourage further immigration.  Associate Director of 
Enforcement, Charles Sava, later visited Miami to find space for holding 
an increased number of deportation hearings and to discuss with Miami 
personnel the processing of Haitians.  Out of those discussions arose 
                                                          
 125.  Id. at 1042 (“It is beyond dispute that some Haitians will be subjected to 
the brutal treatment and bloody prisons of Francois Duvalier upon their deportation” (internal cita-
tions omitted)).  
 126.  Id. at 1026 (“. . .filed a class action in federal district court on behalf of over 4,000 Haitians 
in the south Florida area who had sought political asylum in the United States”).  
 127.  Id. at 1029.  
   128.    Material accompanying footnotes 150 through 151 was previously included in Letter from 
Bill Ong Hing, Professor Univ. San Francisco School of Law, to President Barack Obama (Nov. 4, 
2013) (on file with Author).  
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recommended deterrence measures, which Sava outlined in a letter to 
Deputy Commissioner Noto.  These included “detention of arriving 
Haitians likely to abscond, blanket denials of work permits for Haitians, 
swift expulsion of Haitians from the United States, and enforcement 
actions against smugglers. 
Planning of the Haitian program culminated in a memorandum sent 
on August 20, 1978 by Deputy Commissioner Noto to INS 
Commissioner Leonel J. Castillo.  The memo explained the basic 
mechanics of the accelerated processing already being implemented in 
the Miami district office.  Among the specifics set forth were the 
assignment of additional immigration judges to Miami, the instructions 
to immigration judges to effect a three-fold increase in productivity, and 
orders for the blanket issuance of show cause orders in all pending 
Haitian deportation cases. 
In accordance with the goal of high productivity demanded of the 
Miami office, [Acting District Director] Gullage issued a memorandum 
to all personnel in the office, stating ‘processing of these cases cannot be 
delayed in any manner or in any way.  All supervisory personnel are 
hereby ordered to take whatever action they deem necessary to keep 
these cases moving through the system.’”  The Haitian cases were 
processed at an unprecedented rate.”  Prior to the Haitian program only 
between one and ten deportation hearings were conducted each day.  
During the program, immigration judges held fifty-five hearings per day, 
or approximately eighteen per judge; at the program’s peak the schedule 
of deportation hearings increased to as many as eighty per day.  
 At the show cause or deportation hearing, the immigration judges 
refused to suspend the hearing when an asylum claim was advanced, 
requiring the Haitians instead to respond to the pleadings in the show 
cause order and proceed to a finding of deportability.  The order entered 
by the judge allowed the Haitian ten days for filing an asylum claim with 
the district director, then ten days to request withholding of deportation 
from the immigration judge if the asylum deadline was not met.  Failure 
to seek withholding in a timely manner effected automatic entry of a 
deportation order.  
 Deportation hearings were not the only matter handled during the 
Haitian program.  Asylum interviews also were scheduled at the rate of 
forty per day. Immigration officers who formerly had worked at the 
airport were enlisted as hearing officers for these interviews.  Prior to the 
program such interviews had lasted an hour and a half; during the 
program the officer devoted approximately one-half hour to each Haitian.  
In light of the time-consuming process of communication through 
interpreters, the court concluded that only fifteen minutes of substantive 
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dialogue took place.  Consistent with the result-oriented program 
designed to achieve numerical goals in processing, the Travel Control 
section in the Miami office recorded the daily totals of asylum 
applications processed.  The tally sheet contained space only for the total 
number of denials; there was no column for recording grants of asylum. 
Hearings on requests for withholding deportation also were being 
conducted simultaneously with asylum and deportation hearings, at 
several different locations.  It was not unusual for an attorney 
representing Haitians to have three hearings at the same hour in different 
buildings; this kind of scheduling conflict was a daily occurrence for 
attorneys throughout the Haitian program.  The INS was fully aware that 
only approximately twelve attorneys were available to represent the 
thousands of Haitians being processed, and that scheduling made it 
impossible for counsel to attend the hearings.  It anticipated the 
scheduling conflicts that in fact occurred.  Nevertheless the INS decided 
that resolving the conflicts was ‘too cumbersome for us to handle’ and 
adopted the attitude that everything would simply work out. 
Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the INS had 
knowingly made it impossible for Haitians and their attorneys to prepare 
and file asylum applications in a timely manner.  The court found that 
adequate preparation of an asylum application required between ten and 
forty hours of an attorney’s time.  The court further estimated that if each 
of the attorneys available to represent the Haitians “did nothing during a 
40 hour week except prepare [asylum applications], they would have 
been able to devote only about 2 hours to each client.” 
The results of the accelerated program adopted by INS are revealing. 
None of the over 4,000 Haitians processed during this program were 
granted asylum.129 
In the end, the federal court of appeals struck down the accelerated 
program as a violation of procedural due process.130  The government 
was forced to submit a procedurally fair plan for the orderly reprocessing 
of the asylum applications of the Haitian applicants who had not been 
deported.131 
More recently, litigation challenging the conditions at the Artesia 
facility contributed to its closure.  Of course, pro bono work at the 
Artesia facility by volunteer attorneys contributed pressure to close the 
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 130.  Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1040 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 131.  Id. at 1041.  
2015] ETHICS, MORALITY, AND DISRUPTION 1027 
facility as well.132  They filed affidavits in support of the lawsuit that 
highlighted both the harsh conditions as well as the fact that through 
competent representation, the majority of UACs are eligible for relief.133 
B.  Non-Litigation Disruptions 
1.  Legal Services and Pro Bono Advocates 
The critical role that legal services programs play in representing 
immigrants in day-to-day cases is well known.  A program such as 
Dolores Street Community Services in San Francisco takes on difficult 
asylum cases and criminal immigration deportation defense matters.134  
The Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project provides much 
needed representation to thousands of immigrants each year held in 
detention centers in a rural part of Arizona.135  The Immigration Project 
in Chicago provides a range of visa and deportation defense services to 
immigrants from around the world.136  The same is true for well-
established organizations across the country.  And their services make a 
huge difference, serving as a constant disruption to the over-zealous 
immigration enforcement ICE machine.137 
This important legal services disruption in the immigration area also 
is epitomized by tremendous pro bono efforts by the private bar.  
Consider one recent pro bono effort responding to the unaccompanied 
alien children border crisis. 
For its feature article “Adult Asylum-Seekers Need Lawyers, Too,” 
The National Law Journal profiled the work of Akin Gump first-year 
associate Lauren Connell, whom the firm seconded to its San Antonio 
office to work full time with undocumented Central American women 
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and children seeking asylum and being held at the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Karnes City, Texas, detention center. 
In late August [2014, the national law firm,] Akin Gump[,] formed 
the Karnes City Immigrant Family Pro Bono Project with representatives 
from the University of Texas Law School Immigration Clinic, the 
Tahirih Justice Center in Houston, the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association in Austin and Human Rights First in Houston.138 
The project was a critical response to the Obama administration’s 
incarceration of unaccompanied children and children coming with 
mothers from Central America seeking asylum and being held at the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Karnes City, Texas, detention 
center.139  “[T]he Karnes City Residential Center . . . holds 170 to 200 
female detainees in various early stages of the asylum process who face 
deportation. . . . [M]ore than [twenty] Akin Gump attorneys [] coordinate 
legal assistance for these women and their children,” and the firm has 
trained dozens of other pro bono attorneys who travel to Karnes from 
across the country.140 
Steven Schulman, Akin Gump’s pro bono partner, is on the project’s 
advisory committee.  [He was struck by how] many of the women whom 
the firm is assisting are victims of abuse and sexual assault seeking 
asylum as a way to escape from the violence they face in their home 
countries. . . . [T]he brevity of the asylum screening interview, done via a 
translator, means that many women can’t express their fears well enough 
by interview’s end, saying, “That’s why we were called in, [to] see 
whether we could get lawyers down there to throw sand into the gears.  
We weren’t trying to break a system, but we were trying to slow it 
down.”141 
2.  Immigrant Disruptions 
During his campaign for the presidency in 2008, Barack Obama 
pledged to push for comprehensive immigration reform within the first 
year of his administration.142  However, as the President spent most of his 
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first year dealing with the financial crisis, his primary legislative efforts 
were focused on health care reform, and the Affordable Care Act was not 
signed until March 23, 2010.143  At that point, the President and 
democratic congressional leaders, who controlled both houses at the time 
tried unsuccessfully to pass a comprehensive immigration bill.144 
With the chance of comprehensive reform fading in 2010, 
DREAMers urged congressional leaders at the very least to pass the 
DREAM Act.  The House of Representatives passed the bill on 
December 8, 2010 by a vote of 216 to 198.145  However, a few days later, 
the Senate only came up with 55 votes to  bypass a filibuster of the 
DREAM Act—five votes short of the sixty needed to bring the 
legislation to an actual up or down vote.146 
Disappointed, DREAMers and immigrant rights advocates continued 
their well-documented campaign of protests.  For example, on June 27, 
2011, six DREAMers were arrested in Atlanta, Georgia, for blocking an 
intersection in front of the state capitol.147  Nataly Ibarra, a 16-year-old 
high school student, stated: “It’s time to stand up and let the world know 
that we need to fight for what we believe in.”148  A month later, about 
twenty DREAMers interrupted a speech by President Obama at a 
conference in Washington, D.C.  One DREAMer from Florida, Felipe 
Matos, explained: “We stood up while President Obama gave another of 
his predictable speeches on immigration because we are outraged at his 
trying to promote his election among Latinos while continuing to deport 
us at a time when there is no legislative solution to the immigration 
crisis.”149  The protestors wore shirts that read: “Obama Deports 
DREAMers.”150  During the 2012 presidential campaign, two dozen 
DREAMers staged a sit-in at Obama campaign headquarters in Denver in 
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early June.151  They demanded an executive order ending the deportation 
of DREAMers.152  That spring, their presence was so strong, that even 
Republican Senator Marco Rubio requested a meeting with Gaby 
Pacheco, a DREAM leader, to discuss how to get the DREAM Act 
passed.153  Rubio considered introducing his own version of the DREAM 
Act.154 
The DREAMer disruption yielded results.  On June 15, 2012, 
President Obama announced that he would exercise prosecutorial 
discretion and not deport DREAMers who had entered the United States 
prior to the age of 16.155  They also would be granted work permits for 
two years with an opportunity to renew.156  This was an amazing 
discretionary act that could benefit 800,000 individuals.157 
While President Obama’s action on behalf of DREAMers was 
consistent with the immigration agency’s traditional prosecutorial 
discretion to grant deferred action to sympathetic, albeit, deportable 
immigrants,158 the scope was unprecedented.  Republican critics argued 
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that he went beyond the scope of his authority.159  And the president 
himself, only a year earlier, denied that he could “just suspend 
deportations [of DREAMers] through executive order.”160 
As 2010 drew to a close and the DREAM Act failed in the Senate, 
prospects for comprehensive immigration reform further dimmed as 
Republicans took control of the House of Representatives.161  Serious 
bipartisan immigration legislation was not considered until after the 2012 
presidential elections.  With the reelection of Barack Obama, many in the 
Republican Party sensed that if they were ever to retake the White 
House, Latino votes would be necessary, and passing comprehensive 
immigration reform was a prerequisite.162 
With much fanfare and relative swiftness, on June 27, 2013, the 
Senate passed a comprehensive bill that was hammered out by four 
Democrats and four Republicans.163  The bill was attacked by the right as 
providing amnesty for lawbreakers and by the left for being too strict on 
enforcement and providing an unreasonably long path to citizenship.164  
But the Republican-controlled House never permitted an up or down vote 
on the Senate bill, casting aside any concern over appeasing Latino 
voters.165  Thus, efforts at comprehensive immigration reform failed 
again in 2013 and 2014, as it had in 2010. 
While congressional efforts over immigration reform ebbed and 
flowed in 2013 and 2014, the ICE enforcement machine did not ease up.  
Although the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program 
for DREAMers was in full swing and about 500,000 DREAMers 
benefited, Obama’s ICE deportations continued at record pace.166  
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Families continued to be separated as immigrant workers and parents of 
citizens and DACA recipients were removed.167  Enforcement was so 
intense, that President Obama was dubbed the “deporter-in-chief” by 
immigrants, their allies, and even the news media.168  The image has 
been exacerbated by the fact that Congress inserted into Homeland 
Security’s 2009 spending bill a requirement that ICE keep a minimum of 
33,400 undocumented immigrants locked up at all times (rounded up to 
34,000 in 2011).169  Private prison companies make close to $500 million 
each year for this ICE “bed mandate.”170 
Thus, in spite of the implementation of DACA for DREAMers, the 
president came under fierce criticism for record deportations.  
Congressman Luis Gutierrez and the University of Arizona estimated 
that as many as 90,000 to 100,000 undocumented parents were separated 
from their U.S. citizen children each year.171  Immigrant rights advocates 
argued that the Obama administration is only “paying lip service to a 
different strategy” and that the detention of criminal and noncriminal 
immigrants under the Bush and Obama administrations are essentially 
the same.172 
With no realistic hope for comprehensive immigration legislation, 
critics of the continuing deportations demanded that the president act 
administratively to defer the deportation of anyone who would have been 
granted protection under the Senate bill that had been passed in 2013.173  
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In one well-publicized exchange, DACA recipient Ju Hong interrupted 
the president’s speech, exclaiming: “[O]ur families are separated. . . . Mr. 
President, please use your executive order to halt deportations for all 
11.5 [million] undocumented immigrants in this country right now.”174  
The President responded: “[I]f in fact I could solve all these problems 
without passing laws in Congress, then I would do so.  But we’re also a 
nation of laws.  That’s part of our tradition.  And so, the easy way out is 
to try to yell and pretend like I can do something by violating our 
laws.”175 
In spite of the President’s remarks suggesting that he could not act 
administratively—just as he had previously denied that he could act 
specifically on protecting DREAMERs,176 on November 20, 2014, the 
President took executive action to block the deportation of four to five 
million more undocumented immigrants, primarily the parents of U.S. 
citizen children or lawful permanent resident children.177  His 
announcement even included the intent to end the Secure Communities 
program.178 This was another bold action by the president of 
unprecedented scope—even broader than the action on behalf of 
DREAMers.  On cue, Republicans claimed that the President acted 
unconstitutionally,179 and legal challenges were filed.180  And the 
immigrant rights community complained that parents of DREAMers 
were not included in the order.181  In the meantime, the White House and 
community based organizations were preparing for the implementation 
of the new program.182 
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C.  Executive Disruption 
I have been intrigued by the use of the term “disruptive” in the 
business pages as of late.  A disruptive technology is one that displaces 
an established technology and shakes up the industry or is a ground-
breaking product that creates a completely new industry.  For example, 
an October 2014 article in Forbes, Ten Companies That Are Disrupting 
Their Industries Through Technology, noted: 
Looking for a competitive advantage?  Try crushing the competition by 
becoming a leader in your category.  How can you do that?  By 
changing the rules of the game.  By reinventing the way business is 
done in your industry.  And by using technology to scale quickly, 
forcing your competition to play catch-up. 
Following are ten companies that have done all of the above.  Can you 
find in their stories best practices that will help you disrupt your 
industry and become a market leader?183 
Thus, a disruptive innovation is one that helps create a 
new market and value network, and eventually disrupts an existing 
market and value network (over a few years or decades), displacing an 
earlier technology.184  The term is used in business and technology 
literature to describe innovations that improve a product or service in 
ways that the market does not expect, typically first by designing for a 
different set of consumers in a new market and later by lowering prices 
in the existing market.185  The term “disruptive technology” has been 
widely used as a synonym of “disruptive innovation,” but the latter is 
now preferred, because market disruption has been found to be a function 
usually not of technology itself but rather of its changing application.186 
Thus, the protests of immigrants, such as DREAMers, and their 
supporters disrupting and challenging the immigration enforcement 
regime are important.  Their actions—conventional in the sense that sit-
ins, protests, and media campaigns are part of the American call for 
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social change—have led to changes in immigration enforcement, but are 
not themselves the disruptive innovation in immigration enforcement.  
But the results of these actions have led to disruptive innovation in 
immigration enforcement, namely, President Obama’s executive actions 
which have led to the disruption of the conventional rules of 
enforcement, thereby forcing ICE officers to defer action against large 
classes of removable individuals for policy reasons.  In other words, the 
conventional enforcement lens of whether or not the person is removable 
is forced to give way to a more nuanced lens of giving deference to 
removable individuals who meet certain criteria.  That is disruptive 
innovation that disrupts the way we look at enforcement—internally and 
externally. 
D.  Human Rights Disruption 
Viewing immigration enforcement through a comparative lens 
reveals that disruptive innovation of immigration enforcement already 
has occurred in the European Union (EU).  For example, by adopting a 
Human Rights Convention with strong commitments to maintaining 
family ties, the idea of simply deporting someone who is undocumented 
or who has committed a crime has been disrupted; much more than 
improper papers or a criminal conviction must be considered before a 
person is deported.  In the EU, someone facing deportation essentially 
can argue that the punishment of deportation must fit the crime and the 
effect of deportation on the person and his or her family must be given 
great weight.187 
The idea that the punishment must fit the crime often is stated in 
legal terms as lacking in “proportionality,” related to notions of due 
process or the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when the 
punishment is too severe.188  In the deportation context, a strong case has 
been made that the sanction of removal may very well be impermissibly 
disproportional to the criminal behavior that makes a person 
deportable.189  For example, Angela Banks has reasoned that since 
deportation can be punitive: 
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The [Supreme] Court’s conclusion that the Due Process Clause 
prohibits punishment that is “greater than reasonably necessary to 
punish and deter” is an important development for deportation.  It 
opens the door for new conversations about the scope of the state’s 
power to deport noncitizens.  This jurisprudence suggests that 
deportation decisions, like punitive damage awards, must be 
proportional and that excessive or disproportionate deportation orders 
exceed the authority of the state to regulate immigration.190 
The use of a proportionality lens in assessing the propriety of 
deportation is common in European tribunals.  For example, in Nasri v. 
France,191 the European Court of Human Rights blocked the deportation 
of a 35-year-old Algerian national who had several convictions—
including theft, assault, and participation in a gang rape: 
[R]emoving the applicant from his family and sending him to a country 
with which he has no ties would expose him to suffering of such 
gravity that to do so might be regarded as inhuman treatment.  In a 
democratic society which adheres to the principle of respect for the 
dignify of the human person, a measure of such severity cannot be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of maintaining public order.192 
The European Commission of Human Rights agreed to review 
Nasri’s case on proportionality grounds and considered several 
psychological evaluations, the possibility that he would be tortured back 
in Algeria, and the fact that his “family relationships would be made 
impossible” if he were deported.  After considering these factors, the 
commission concluded that Nasri’s deportation was disproportionate and 
could not be justified.193 
In AR (Pakistan) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,194 
the deportation of an asylum applicant who had been granted indefinite 
permission to remain in the United Kingdom was upheld, but not until 
the applicant had been given two warnings following several criminal 
convictions and unsuccessful participation in drug rehabilitation 
programs.195  The question in the words of the Court of Appeal in the 
United Kingdom in these cases is “whether deportation is proportionate, 
                                                          
 190.  Id. at 1669; see also Wishnie, supra note 188, at 457 (arguing that the additional punish-
ments of deportation and exile for lawful permanent residents convicted of aggravated felonies, 
“may contravene the due process requirement of proportionality.”). 
 191.  Nasri v. France, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 458 (1996). 
 192.  Id. at 470. (emphasis added). 
 193.  Id. at 466–70. 
 194.  [2010] EWCA (Civ) 816, 2010 WL 2754134 (Eng.).  
 195.  Id. 
2015] ETHICS, MORALITY, AND DISRUPTION 1037 
giving due weight to the public interest and to the right to family life.”196  
And the “task of deciding whether deportation is or is not proportionate 
typically involves weighing up conflicting factors.”197 
In deciding that the deportation was not disproportionate, the Court 
of Appeal considered the criminal record and the warnings that had been 
issued.  But the court also paid close attention to the fact that the 
applicant had children.  The applicant and his wife had divorced, and 
their three children lived with their maternal grandparents.198  As in the 
Nasri case, the court was well aware of the fundamental right to family 
life protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.199  However, the court was influenced by the fact that the 
applicant’s earlier close contact with his children was no longer the 
pattern—in part because of his intermittent time in prison—and therefore 
was insufficient “to outweigh the public interest in his deportation.”200 
In a much broader way, the EU has disrupted the notion of 
immigration enforcement by the elimination of borders between member 
states.  Under the current structure of the EU, workers who are citizens 
of different states may freely migrate to other states.201  Unlike the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, which provides for the free flow of 
products—but not workers—between Mexico, Canada, and the United 
States, the EU includes workers as well as trade goods between its 
members.202  That is a wholly disruptive way of looking at 
immigration—at least between member nations. 
E.  Public Oversight Disruption 
The examples of abusive or morally-questionable ICE enforcement 
strategies outlined in this essay demand oversight of the agency through 
an ethical lens—oversight grounded in a sense of morality, humanistic 
values, and human rights.  While congressional committees may be 
charged with oversight of DHS, an independent public entity is needed 
that reviews and reports on the enforcement actions of ICE so that the 
agency’s actions are regularly in plain view.  The fact of congressional 
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oversight or even an agency internal affairs department clearly is 
insufficient, given the ICE enforcement efforts that go unchecked except 
for successful litigation challenges in the most outrageous cases. 
The history of civilian review boards of police departments is 
relevant to understanding why a similar public body is needed to 
regularly report on questionable immigration enforcement.  Civilian 
review boards are composed of citizen representatives charged with the 
investigation of complaints by members of the public concerning police 
misconduct.203  The general goal of these boards is to enhance police 
accountability by ensuring that officers treat individuals without bias, use 
appropriate levels of force, operate free of corruption, and that 
procedures exist for the fair receipt and investigation of complaints 
against the police.204  Citizen involvement in the oversight of police is 
viewed as a valuable way to prevent misconduct. 
The first interest in creating enforceable standards for police 
behavior emerged in the 1920s.205 This was an era focused on the police 
“professional” including the “creation of written policies on the use of 
force, arrest procedures, . . . and the advent of Internal Affairs 
Departments (IADs).”206  Police reform during this time relied primarily 
on a strong police chief executive to implement change in a top-down 
method.207  One famous example of such a police chief was August 
Vollmer in Berkeley, California.208  His reforms in the police department 
were heralded as raising personnel standards and modernizing 
management.209  However, the problem with reform implemented by 
police chiefs is that it was a temporary solution; eventually that chief 
would leave the department and take with them the tools of change.210  
Consequently, another method of regulating police behavior was needed. 
In the 1920s and 1930s ideas begin to emerge about how police 
behavior could be regulated outside of the police department.  Volunteer 
attorneys in the Los Angeles area during the 1920s proposed the idea of 
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having private citizens evaluate complaints against police officers.211  
Later, in 1931 the Wickersham Commission established by President 
Hoover recommended the creation of “some disinterested agency” in 
each city to assist people with their complaints.212 
By the late 1940s, race riots and civil unrest spurred activists to push 
for civilian review boards.213  Continuing racial tensions in cities like 
New York, Detroit, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles finally 
spearheaded the creation of the first citizen oversight agency in this 
country.  Formally instituted in 1948, the citizen review board for the 
Metropolitan Police in the District of Columbia was the first oversight 
agency developed in this country.214  It was comprised of three citizens 
who reviewed complaints referred by the police chief and offered 
suggestions on the proper disposition of each case.215  However, as was 
the case with many review boards,216 local politicians and law 
enforcement representatives worked against the board to hinder its 
effectiveness.  Though the agency remained in existence until the mid-
1990s, lack of adequate funding and a large backlog of cases eventually 
led to its demise.217  Although reformers saw this as a setback, oversight 
agencies around the country continued to develop. 
The Philadelphia American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) called for 
the creation of a civilian review board in 1957 because of the strained 
relationship between the police and the black community.218  In 1958, 
Philadelphia would produce the first significant oversight agency, called 
the Philadelphia Police Advisory Board.219  An executive order issued by 
Mayor Richardson Dillworth created the agency.220  The agency 
consisted of a board of citizens that would receive complaints, refer the 
complaints to the police department for investigation, and after reviewing 
the department’s reports, make recommendations for action.221  Similar 
to what happened in Washington, this board suffered from a lack of 
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public and private support.222  This lack of support, combined with 
financial instability and an overwhelming number of cases collectively 
led to its closure in 1969.223 
Unfortunately, the backlash against citizen oversight by police 
unions, police officials, and police associations, including the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), continued to limit 
the viability of citizen review boards.  “Arguments against oversight 
included the belief that the police could discipline their own, that 
corruption was not as rampant as the media led the public to believe, and 
that oversight would undermine the police’s autonomy and ability to 
effectively perform its job.”224  For example, opponents of citizen 
oversight, most notably powerful police unions, were successful in their 
efforts to diminish any momentum on the part of oversight advocates in 
New York City, leading the New York City Civilian Complaint Review 
Board (NYCCRB) to suffer the same fate as the Washington and 
Philadelphia boards.225  Teamed with the Policeman’s Benevolent 
Association, police unions staged a successful campaign in New York to 
convince voters to abolish the NYCCRB in 1966.226 
However, civil rights tensions and progress in major cities in the 
United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s reversed this trend 
and reinstated a serious call for citizen accountability of the police.227  As 
public confidence and trust in government agencies waned, the desire for 
increased police accountability was refueled.228  For example, Kansas 
City established a citizen review system in 1969 that continues to survive 
today.229  Additionally, Chicago established the Office of Professional 
Standards (OPS) in 1974, a civilian staffed office that worked to expose 
police brutality and the misuse of force.230  This office continues to 
operate today in Chicago along with a Police Board consisting of nine 
civilian appointed members.231 
The Chicago Police Board functions as an appellate body to which 
accused officers may seek final review.  Police endorsement of these 
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review system increased public support, leading to a renewed growth in 
this accountability mechanism across the country.232  In fact, cities such 
as Berkeley, Detroit and San Francisco have developed and maintained 
citizen oversight agencies since the 1970s and 1980s.233  In 1993, New 
York also reconstituted an all-civilian complaint review board 
(CCRB).234  The CCRB is now the largest civilian review board in the 
United States and presides over thousands of complaints annually.235  
Today, 128 citizen oversight agencies operate across the country and 
have an important impact on the oversight of police misconduct and 
accountability.236 
The ICE raids of Swift meatpacking plants in 2006 actually led to the 
establishment of a short-lived review body that is a good example of 
potential public review of immigration enforcement.237  After ICE swept 
up and detained thousands of workers from six meatpacking plants 
across the country during one of the nation’s largest immigration raids, 
the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) empaneled a 
group of former elected officials, labor leaders, academics, civil rights 
leaders and immigration and legal experts who spent more than a year 
holding regional hearings, interviewing witnesses and soliciting input 
from a wide range of workers, elected officials, policy experts, 
psychologists, and religious and community leaders.238  The commission 
then released a comprehensive report documenting the devastation and 
destruction that immigration raids had on families, workplaces, and 
communities across the country.239 The report, Raids on Workers: 
Destroying Our Rights, offered a critical analysis of one of the central 
components of the Bush Administration’s immigration strategy and 
provided a detailed account of how heavy-handed enforcement tactics 
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led to systemic abuse of workers’ rights and a willful disregard for the 
rule of law.240 
According to Joseph T. Hansen, founding chairman of the 
commission and president of the UFCW: 
What we have uncovered is that during the Bush Administration ICE 
agents repeatedly trampled on innocent workers’ constitutional rights.  
These were not isolated incidents, but systemic problems that occurred 
in almost every region of the country.  No government agency is above 
the law, and no worker should have to face the mistreatment and 
misconduct that these hardworking men and women were subjected to 
under the Bush Administration.241 
Upon its creation, the commissioners set out to achieve the following 
objectives: conduct hearings on allegations of ICE abuse and misconduct 
in locations across the country; hear from workers and their families on 
the impact of ICE raids; hear testimony from community leaders, 
academics, constitutional experts, and the business community; inform 
the public and elected officials; and issue a report on the findings with a 
plan of action to protect workers’ constitutional rights from any future 
abuse.242 
At each hearing, clear patterns began to emerge regarding the tactics 
used by ICE agents and how the procedures used by these officials were 
compromising the rights of workers.  The testimony the commission 
received revealed several disturbing patterns: U.S. citizens and legal 
permanent residents detained for hours unable to leave even after 
establishing their status; a lack of coordination by ICE with state and 
local labor and child welfare agencies; violations of the Fourth 
Amendment; the use of massive amounts of taxpayer resources and 
personnel to administer civil warrants; repeated incidents of racial 
profiling and harassment; the human toll of immigration enforcement, 
including family separation and children left without proper care; and 
lasting economic and psychological devastation of communities and 
families in the aftermath of workplace and community raids.243 
Among its many recommendations, the UFCW report urged vigorous 
oversight of ICE’s activities and the enhancement of legal protections 
against abuse.244  At least for a period of time, the report had some 
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impact.  As the Obama administration came into office, new DHS 
secretary Janet Napolitano announced that Bush-style ICE raids were not 
part of her enforcement strategy.245  However, as we have seen, several 
years later, ICE restarted strikingly-similar operations under the auspices 
of its targeted enforcement raids.246  And other Obama administration 
enforcement abuses such as Secure Communities were instituted.247  If 
the oversight recommended by the UFCW had been in place, these 
abuses may have been stopped or at least restrained. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Speaking before an audience at Washington State University several 
years ago, I was challenged by a member of the campus Republican 
student group who was upset at my criticism of the attempted 
prosecution of Shanti Sellz and David Strauss.  Sellz and Strauss were 
college students who were volunteering with “No More Deaths,” a 
human rights organization at the border that provided water and other 
sustenance to border crossers facing searing desert heat in the middle of 
the summer.  They were arrested and charged with knowing 
transportation of undocumented immigrants within the United States 
after they drove two migrants who were dying of exposure to the 
hospital.248 
“How can you defend the actions [of Sellz and Strauss]?  They knew 
the crossers were illegal,” demanded the young Republican.  I asked him, 
“What would you have them do—allow the individuals they came across 
to simply die?”  His answer was an emphatic “yes.”  Stunned, my 
reaction was esoteric—about how the U.S. Attorney should have 
exercised prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute and how the actions of 
Sellz and Strauss were acts of civil disobedience. 
Back at my hotel later that evening, I thought back on the exchange.  
In retrospect, what I should have asked the young man was, “Really, let 
them die?  Is that what your parents have taught you?”  And since that 
time, I have realized, it is not just about whether his parents should have 
done better to help him develop a more humane moral compass.  The 
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task belongs to all of us.  We have the duty to remind him and others that 
there is more to life and more to being a member of a global society than 
enforcing immigration laws that separate families in the name of 
maintaining borders. 
Increased ICE raids, stepped up border enforcement, and employer 
sanctions have not reduced undocumented immigration to the United 
States.  The failure of these harsh efforts must teach us something.  The 
enforcement-only approach has resulted in human tragedy, increased 
poverty, and family separation, while undocumented workers continue to 
flow into the United States.  This is a challenge that requires us to 
understand why workers come here and to address the challenge in a 
more sensible manner. 
In the meantime, I encourage those who agree that our nation’s 
methods of enforcing immigration laws is lacking a strong moral base, to 
engage in disruptive actions until our leaders come up with more 
innovative disruptions of that enforcement philosophy.  Just as on-the-
street disruption has led to disruptive innovation, namely, the 
monumental executive action announcements by President Obama, we 
can push for more.  Parents of DREAMers have been left out of these 
protections.  Lawful permanent residents and refugees who have been 
labelled “aggravated felons” have been left out—even those who 
demonstrate clear progress toward rehabilitation.  Immigration laws and 
procedures result in deportation decisions devoid of any sense of human 
rights values or proportionality. 
Constant disruption is needed in all forms—protests, public 
oversight, immigrant engagement, litigation, and individual 
representation—if we are to convince public policy leaders to review 
immigration enforcement policies with a moral foundation. With that 
foundation, our leaders can begin to reinvent and disrupt the reigning 
U.S. approach to immigration enforcement. The rules can be changed 
and enforcement philosophy reframed. 
 
